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EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES TO PREVENT
FRAUD IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
John M. Bradley*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the significant problem of fraud within
nonprofit organizations and demonstrates that current anti-fraud
measures do not adequately reflect the important role employees play in
perpetuating or stopping fraudulent activity. Psychological and organizational behavior studies have established the importance of (1) participation and (2) peers in shaping the behavior of individuals within the
organizational context. This Article builds on that research and establishes that to successfully combat fraud, organizations must integrate
employees into the design, implementation, and enforcement of antifraud strategy and procedures. Engaged, empowered employees will be
less likely to commit fraud and more likely to dissuade their peers from
fraudulent behavior. After examining the theory underlying the proposed approach, this Article sets forth directions and specific suggestions for designing an anti-fraud program that empowers employees.
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1 Ann E. Marimow & Mary Pat Flaherty, Md. Woman Admits Stealing Millions from D.C. Nonprofit, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/md-womanadmits-stealing-millions-from-dc-nonprofit/2013/11/25/723a7c14-55f6-11e3-835d-e7173847c
7cc_story.html.
2 Ohio Woman Gets 2 Years for $588,000 Theft at Nonprofit, THE CHRON.OF PHILANTHROPY
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://philanthropy.com/blogs/philanthropytoday/ohio-woman-gets-2-yearsfor-588000-theft-at-nonprofit/89871.
3 Oxnard Woman Admits to Embezzling from Ventura Nonprofit, VENTURA CNTY. STAR, Oct.
3, 2013, http://www.vcstar.com/news/oxnard-woman-admits-to-embezzlement-from-ventura.
4 See Suzanne Perry, Government Regulators Need More Money and Data, Experts Say, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 12, 2013), http://philanthropy.com/article/Government-RegulatorsNeed/137269/ (reporting that officials and experts believe that “both state and federal regulatory systems were inadequate to the task of monitoring more than 1 million charities”); Kevin
P. Kearns, Accountability in the Nonprofit Sector, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 587 (2d
ed. 2012) (“Well documented that the IRS lacks the resources and management capacity to effectively performs its oversight role.”).
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Reports of employees defrauding nonprofit organizations headline
the news in communities every day: “An administrative assistant admitted Monday to stealing more than $5million from the Association of
American Medical Colleges”;1 “The payroll supervisor at a charity in
Reynoldsburg, Ohio . . . used her position to embezzle $588,121 from
the organization”;2 “An Oxnard woman accused of embezzling more
than $400,000 from a Ventura nonprofit group pleaded guilty . . . .”3
Fraud perpetrated against nonprofit organizations by their employees is part of a consistent and, by some reports, growing ethical
problem within nonprofit organizations. Yet despite the attention of
lawmakers, regulators, and sector watchdogs, the lack of regulatory resources demands that the task of confronting problematic ethical issues
such as fraud largely falls to the organizations themselves.4
Fraud is a troublesome aspect of a nonprofit sector that continues
to advance in size and scope. Since the mid-twentieth century, the
nonprofit sector has steadily grown as a percentage of United States
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5 KATIE L. ROEGER ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 9-13 (Kathleen Courrier et al. eds.,
2012) (nonprofit sector percentage of GDP steadily grew over past 60 years and now accounts
for more than 5.5% the U.S. GDP).
6 See id. (reporting that in 2012, there were approximately 2.3 million nonprofits: 1.6 million organizations were registered with the IRS, 300,000 were religious corporations, and a final
400,000 were smaller organizations); National Center for Charitable Statistics, Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 2003-2013, URB INST., http://nccsweb.urban.org/Pub
Apps/profile1.php?state=US (reporting that in 2013, there were 1,407,459 nonprofit organizations in 2013).
7 LESTER M. SALAMON, The Resilient Sector: The Future of Nonprofit America, in THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA 3, 8 (2012).
8 See infra § I.
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economic activity.5 Some two million organizations are now engaged in
efforts to end homelessness, provide cancer treatments, preserve ecosystems, improve education, and contribute to a number of other
worthwhile endeavors.6 More than thirteen million people work for
these organizations.7 Yet in the midst of the real good accomplished by
these dedicated organizations and people, fraud may be costing the sector some $40 billion—5% of the sector’s revenues—each year.8
Despite the complicity of employees in this problem, this Article
proposes that the solution depends upon enlisting the assistance of the
employees themselves. The dominant efforts to prevent fraud have
approached the problem by focusing on oversight mechanisms or the
example of those in leadership, with employee involvement playing a
much smaller role—if at all—in the overall strategy. By concentrating
on employees, this Article sees fraud as an outgrowth of ethical decision-making, and examines how an organization can positively affect its
personnel’s ethical decision-making by fully integrating employees in its
fraud prevention strategy.
Integration and empowerment entails more than simply giving
employees codes of conduct, reporting mechanisms, and training—
although each of those are important parts of a comprehensive program. Empowering employees means soliciting and incorporating their
ideas into the organization’s fraud prevention strategy and their participation in its investigatory framework. It means issuing codes and policies that employees have co-authored—not simply received—and designing trainings with employees as leaders—not just attendees. It
means making them part of the structure that is expected to stop fraud.
Lawyers who advise nonprofit organizations may instinctively object that placing employees in a position to help protect the organization against employee wrongdoing is the proverbial fox guarding the
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henhouse. But, as this Article demonstrates, social psychology and organizational behavior research suggests that employee involvement
uniquely contributes to preventing fraud. To capture this effect, those
charged with preventing and stopping employee fraud should include
employees as co-owners invested in anti-fraud efforts.
In Section I, this Article sets forth the fraud problem facing nonprofit organizations and the nonprofit sector as a whole. While there is
a need for researchers to collect more data specific to the nonprofit
sector, the available information demonstrates a fraud problem that is
significant to intended beneficiaries of nonprofit work, all nonprofit organizations (whether or not they have been a victim), and society. Section II reviews the current approaches that dominate anti-fraud efforts
(II.A.) and explains why the suggested approach of empowering employees should be adopted (II.B.). In so doing, the Article relies on research in the psychology and organizational behavior disciplines. Section III, taking direction from the cited research, provides specific
advice for integrating employees into a fraud prevention program.
I. THE NONPROFIT SECTOR’S FRAUD PROBLEM

C M
Y K
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9 Throughout this article, I use the terms “occupational fraud” and “fraud” interchangeably to stand for any scheme in which a person “use[s] . . . one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets.” ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS
ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 6 (2014).
10 Id. The estimate of $40.24 billion is reached by multiplying the amount U.S. nonprofits
contributed to U.S. GDP in 2010 ($804.8 billion) by the percentage of revenue that was estimated to be lost to occupational fraud in ACFE Reports from 2010 to 2014 (5%): see also, Janet
Greenlee et al., An Investigation of Fraud in Nonprofit Organizations: Occurrences and Deterrents, 36
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 676, 677 (2007) (estimating that fraud loss to the nonprofit sector in 2004 was $40 billion).
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Nonprofit organizations suffer significant losses each year to occupational fraud.9 By some estimates, more than $40 billion of nonprofit funds are misused or misapplied for personal enrichment rather
than nonprofit work within the United States each year.10 To put that
figure in context, the amount of nonprofit assets lost to fraud each year
is equivalent to the combined revenue of twenty of the largest and most
well-known United States-based nonprofits: the United Way, Salvation
Army, Catholic Charities USA, Goodwill Industries International,
YMCA, World Vision, St. Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital, Boys &
Girls Clubs of America, American Red Cross, Habitat for Humanity In-
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ternational, Feed the Children, Nature Conservancy, American Heart
Association, United States Fund for UNICEF, Mayo Clinic, Care USA,
Boy Scouts of America, and Susan G. Komen for the Cure.11 This is a
staggering amount of financial loss.
Given the furtive nature of fraud, a confident estimate is difficult
to provide,12 but the available data shows that fraud-attributable losses
to nonprofit organizations are neither rare nor insignificant. Britain’s
National Fraud Authority put fraud losses to its charitable sector in
2013 at 0.22% of the income of all charities.13 Applied to United States
nonprofits, the loss to fraud would be $1.7 billion—a still substantial
figure.14 Another way to view the problem is by considering the number of organizations affected. The Washington Post found that from
2008 to 2012, more than 1,000 tax-exempt organizations had disclosed
on their annual IRS Form 990 that they had “discovered a ‘significant
diversion’ of assets, disclosing losses attributed to theft, investment
fraud, embezzlement and other unauthorized uses of funds.”15 Only
diversions of more than $250,000 or five percent of annual gross receipts or total assets are required to be reported to the IRS.16 Given
organizations’ interests in keeping losses quiet as well as their simple
failure to uncover every fraud, such filings likely severely underreport
fraud. Whatever the final numbers, what is certain is that fraud is hurt11
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The 50 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES (Nov. 2013), www.forbes.com/top-charities/list,
(combined revenue for the twenty selected charities is $40.27 billion).
12 See Leslie Lenkowsky, Despite High-Profile ‘Three Cups’ Controversy, Nonprofit Fraud Isn’t Widespread, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Apr. 27, 2011), http://philanthropy.com/article/NonprofitFraud-Isn-t/127268 (calling into question the assumptions built into the $40 billion loss figure).
13 NATIONAL FRAUD AUTHORITY, ANNUAL FRAUD INDICATOR 23 (2013), available at
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/206552/nfa-annualfraud-indicator-2013.pdf (fraud includes both external and internal fraud).
14 The $1.7 billion figure is reached by multiplying $804.8 billion by .0022. For an estimate
in the middle of these extremes, see, GERARD ZACK, FRAUD AND ABUSE IN NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO PREVENTION AND DETECTION xvi (2003) (estimating loss to
nonprofit sector of $10 billion).
15 Joe Stephens & Mary Pat Flaherty, Inside the Hidden World of Thefts, Scams and Phantom Purchases at the Nation’s Nonprofits, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/investigations/inside-the-hidden-world-of-thefts-scams-and-phantom-purchases-atthe-nations-nonprofits/2013/10/26/825a82ca-0c26-11e3-9941-6711ed662e71_story.html.
16 IRS instructions only require disclosure of losses “if the gross value of all diversions (not
taking into account restitution, insurance, or similar recoveries) discovered during the organization’s tax year exceeds the lesser of (1) 5% of the organization’s gross receipts for its tax year,
(2) 5% of the organization’s total assets as of the end of its tax year, or (3) $250,000.”
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FORM 990: INSTRUCTIONS 21
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf.
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ing individual organizations, intended beneficiaries, and the reputation
of the nonprofit sector.
Employees commit more fraud than any other group—and have
for quite some time.17 They commit fraud in a number of ways: for example, by pocketing fees for services before they are recorded in the
organization’s books, by having a fictitious entity paid for services not
actually rendered, by filing false expense reports, by gaining from an
undisclosed conflict of interest, or by falsifying financial statements.18
All of these schemes have resulted in an ongoing problem, despite increasing attention and efforts to combat it.19
Fraud perpetrated against nonprofits presents particularly troubling problems for society given the direct impact on social welfare.
Services that the nonprofit sector provides—such as in health, education, social services, or cultural activities—go unfulfilled when fraud is
committed. If, as occurred in 2010, $5.7 million of Columbia University’s funds are stolen for an accounting clerk’s and associates’ personal
use instead of going to New York Presbyterian Hospital, then a community’s health suffers.20 Or if, as was discovered in 2012, an employee
17
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ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY (2014) 40 (noting that 42%
of reported frauds were committed by employees in a most recent survey and that this “has
remained remarkably consistent from year to year”).
18 See ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 11 (2014); accord
ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2012 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 12 (2012).
19 ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2014 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 6, 8 (2014); (reporting that a
typical organization is estimated to lose 5% of revenues each year); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED
FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2012
GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 8 (2012) (5%); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS,
REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2010 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY
4 (2010) (5%); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2008 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 8 (2008) (7%); ASSOCIATION
OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND
ABUSE: 2006 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 4 (2006) (5%); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD
EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2004 GLOBAL
FRAUD STUDY 8 (2004) (6%); ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE
NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2002 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 4 (2002) (6%);
ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD AND ABUSE: 1996 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 5-6 (1996) (6%); see also JOSEPH T. WELLS,
CORPORATE FRAUD HANDBOOK: PREVENTION AND DETENTION (4th ed. 2013).
20 Press Release, Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York County, Four Defendants
Found Guilty of Defrauding Columbia University Out of $5.7 Million (Aug. 7, 2012), http://manhattan
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of a small substance abuse organization diverts $20,000 to his personal
use, then someone goes without needed treatment.21
In addition to the direct monetary loss, fraud may have a multiplier effect on an institution by causing contributors to turn away. Nonprofits rely to a significant extent on the goodwill and confidence of
donors and volunteers.22 That confidence and goodwill may quickly
erode when an organization is victimized by fraud.23 For example, donors suspended their commitments to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria when the Associated Press publicized reports
of fraud within the organization.24 As a result, the Global Fund’s ability
to meet its operational goals was threatened.25 The Global Fund is not
alone in suffering a multiplied loss from fraud: 27% of British charities
reported that fraud negatively impacted their reputation, ability to fund
projects, volunteer recruitment, fundraising, or some other operational
aspect.26
Fraud may also work to the detriment of the nonprofit sector as a
whole. Particularly in the United States, nonprofits and the tax benefits

08/14/2015 09:37:37
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da.org/press-release/four-defendants-found-guilty-defrauding-columbia-university-out-57million.
21 See Community Alcohol Information Program, Inc., IRS Form 990: Schedule O (2011),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/nonprofit-diversions-data
base (reporting $20,000 diversion).
22 See Eleanor Brown & David Martin, Individual Giving and Volunteering, in THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA 495, 497 (2d ed. 2012) (stating that private giving accounts for 12.3 percent of revenue across the nonprofit sector, but accounts for as high as sixty-seven percent of
revenue for a subset of nonprofits, specifically those involved in international and foreign affairs); id. at 498 (stating that “[v]olunteer labor is an important resource for the nonprofit sector: in 2008, an estimated 61.8 million people volunteered a medial amount of time equal to one
hour per week).
23 Kristy Holtfreter, Determinants of Fraud Losses in Nonprofit Organizations, NONPROFIT
MGMT. & LEADERSHIP, Fall 2008, at 1 (“Compared to other organizations, nonprofits rely more
heavily on public trust, so they have more to lose when fraud is revealed.”); see also, e.g., Ian Wilhelm, Fraud Investigations Raise New Questions for Beleaguered Red Cross, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Apr. 6, 2006, at 46.
24 Jonathan C. Brown & Wilfred Griekspoor, Fraud at the Global Fund? A Viewpoint, 28 INT’L
J. HEALTH PLAN. & MGMT. 138, 139 (2012); Ann Danaiya Usher, Donors Continue to Hold Back
Support From Global Fund, 378 LANCET 471 (2011); see also Sarah Boseley, Can the Global Fund
Weather the Corruption Storm? GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/
society/sarah-boseley-global-health/2011/jan/28/aids-infectiousdiseases; Bernard Rivers, The
Global Fund at Ten Years: Not a Happy Birthday, AIDSPAN (Feb. 6, 2012), www.aidspan.org/
gfo_article/global-fund-ten-years-not-happy-birthday.
25 See Usher, supra note 24.
26 FRAUD ADVISORY PANEL, FRAUD IN THE CHARITABLE SECTOR 28 (2009), available at
www.fraudadvisorypanel.org/pdf_show_129.pdf.
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they enjoy exist in part because they are viewed as more reliable and responsive than the government27—an idea that suffers if nonprofits are
seen as unable or unwilling to shepherd their resources. Frauds suggest
to donors that the exalted trust in nonprofits may be misplaced.28
Thus, a Gresham’s Law, that is, “bad money drives out good,” may develop, “where publicized fraud cases may result in an unwillingness of
donors to give to any nonprofit.”29 The ongoing occurrence of fraud
may thus be eroding confidence not only in individual nonprofit organizations but also in the ability of the whole sector to perform its work:
the “ineffective[ness of the nonprofit sector] at routing out real and
perceived corruption, fraud, governance and ethics problems” has resulted in the loss of “the public’s trust in its ability to carry out its mission.”30
The heightened problems that fraud creates for nonprofits are sufficient reason to focus on the sector, but another reason exists: fraud
and unethical conduct in general may be on the rise within the nonprofit sector. A 2007 study by the Ethics Resource Center concluded that
“[t]he nonprofit sector that for so long enjoyed a better reputation with
regard to its ethics now exhibits many of the shortcomings . . . found in
. . . the public and private sectors.”31 With respect to the categories of
fraud measured, ERC found rates similar—and in some cases higher—
than business or government.32 For instance, survey results indicated
that 8% of employees in nonprofit organizations observed alteration of
financial records, as compared to 5% of employees in businesses and
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See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 13 (2d ed. 1999)
(stating that there is often, and particularly in the United States, a “preference for some nongovernmental mechanism to deliver services and respond to public needs because of the cumbersomeness, unresponsiveness, and bureaucratization that often accompanies government action”).
28 Margaret Gibelman, A Loss of Credibility: Patterns of Wrongdoing Among Nongovernmental Organizations, 15 VOLUNTAS 355 (2004) (concluding that the “vaulted societal status” of nongovernmental organizations “may render them more susceptible than other types of organizations to public disillusionment”).
29 Greenlee et al., supra note 10, at 677.
30 Scott Harshbarger & Steven Netishen, Watchdog Wanted: Making the Case for Internal Oversight of the Nonprofit Sector, NONPROFIT Q. (Dec. 21, 2008), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
governancevoice/1063-watchdog-wanted-making-the-case-for-internal-oversight-of-thenonprofit-sector.html.
31 ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL NONPROFIT ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW
OF NONPROFIT SECTOR ETHICS iv (2007), available at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/ERC_
s_National_Nonprofit_Ethics_Survey.pdf.
32 Id. at 3-4.
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6% in government.33 Furthermore, within nonprofits, the more general
category of “misconduct” has seen rates, which once were below business and government, catch up: 55% of nonprofit employees observed
one or more acts of misconduct in 2007, compared to 56% and 57%
for business and government, respectively.34 Moreover, a significant
number of nonprofit employees do not report observed misconduct:
about two out of five do not report, a number similar to their for-profit
counterparts.35 Anecdotally, regulators have also reported higher levels
of nonprofit fraud cases.36 Despite such problems, nonprofit leaders
may not be recognizing or responding adequately.37
II. COMBATING FRAUD WITHIN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Faced with the ongoing problem of employee fraud, what have
nonprofit organizations done to stop it?38 Nonprofit organizations appear to have focused their efforts on management and external agents
to design, implement, and enforce fraud prevention strategies. But
33

Id. at 4.
Id. at 2-3; see also MARQUET INTERNATIONAL, THE 2012 MARQUET REPORT ON
EMBEZZLEMENT 3, 23-4 (2013), available at http://www.marquetinternational.com (finding that
over the previous five years, nonprofits and religious organizations experienced 12.2% of all
cases of employee theft in the United States in which at least $100,000 was misappropriated,
putting the sector behind only the financial services industry in prevalence of embezzlements).
35 ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL NONPROFIT ETHICS SURVEY, supra note 31, at 3
(38% of nonprofit employees did not report); compare with ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER,
NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF PRIVATE SECTOR ETHICS 3 (2007)
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/The_2007_National_Business_Ethics_Survey.pdf (42% of
private sector employees did not report) and ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS
ETHICS SURVEY OF THE U.S. WORKFORCE 26 (2013), http://www.ethics.org/downloads/
2013NBESFinalWeb.pdf (37% of private sector employees did not report).
36 Greenlee et al., supra note 10, at 679 (stating that the Massachusetts Attorney General’s
State Charity Office reported that nonprofit fraud cases have been higher during the first half
of the 2000s as compared to the previous decade).
37 Brennen Jensen, Are Charity Leaders Ignoring a Spike in Nonprofit Fraud, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY (May 30, 2009), http://philanthropy.com/blogPost/Are-Charity-LeadersIgnorin/10149.
38 The focus of this article is on what nonprofit organizations can do themselves, as opposed to relying on external authority. The current ability of regulators to monitor nonprofits is
limited, see supra note 4, although calls for more robust intervention is growing. See generally
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the 21st Century: An Institutional
Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480, n.4 (2010) (noting the “heightened interest” in
expanding federal and state oversight of nonprofit governance); Woods Bowman, Nonprofit Accountability and Ethics: Rotting From the Head Down, NONPROFIT Q. (Oct. 26, 2012),
www.nonprofitquarterly.org/management/21259-nonprofit-accountability-and-ethics-rottingfrom-the-head-down.html.
34
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those efforts are not bringing about sufficient success.
This Article proposes that the current, dominant approaches to
combating fraud undervalue and underutilize employees. Fraud would
be more often prevented with processes designed to empower employees. This section reviews the current anti-fraud approaches and then
examines the theoretical bases for empowering employees, establishing
that employee involvement should play an integral role in every organization’s fraud prevention efforts.
A.

Review of Current Approaches: Monitoring, Leadership Tone, Directives to
Employees

Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2014 Global Fraud Study: Anti-Fraud
Controls, ACFE, http://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf.
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Mandates from legal authorities, pressure from interested constituencies, and academic research have produced a range of methods seeking to stop or reduce fraud. The available data and the oft-repeated advice indicate that there are two predominant current approaches: (1)
monitoring mechanisms and (2) articulating standards from top leadership. Providing employees with resources for identifying and reporting
fraud is a distant third approach, although, as this Article argues, even
these efforts are incomplete.
The most recent Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
(“ACFE”) Global Fraud Survey shows that monitoring methods dominate nonprofit organizations’ approach to fraud prevention. The
ACFE inquired as to the frequency of eighteen anti-fraud controls for
its 2014 report. Only five controls were used by more than half of the
surveyed nonprofits: external audit (77.1%), code of conduct (67.2%),
management certification of financial statements (64.8%), independent
audit committee (54.5%), and internal audit department (52.1%).39
With the exception of the code of conduct, which is best categorized as
part of the second dominant approach (articulating standards from top
leadership), each of these methods employs a monitoring approach.
Three major criticisms have been leveled at the reliance on monitors. First, if monitoring is the dominant aspect of a fraud prevention
program, it conveys the message that the reason not to transgress the
rules is to avoid punishment. Because the goal is to avoid punishment,
the impetus for anti-fraud controls is merely instrumental, stripping
away any moral import to the fraud rules. As a consequence, employ-
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ees are subtly encouraged to think like economically rational actors—
pursue your self-interest—rather than pursuing what is the morally correct thing to do.40 Second, monitoring tells employees that they are not
trusted. This may lead to employees seeing management/the organization as something in opposition to them and result in lower employee
performance.41 It may also push employees to behave consistently with
how they believe they are being treated, i.e., as not worthy of trust.42
Finally, monitoring entails significant economic costs that can make it
infeasible for many organizations, particularly the numerous nonprofits
that are small in terms of capital and people.43 Each of these criticisms
supports the idea that monitoring should not be the primary focus of
an entity’s anti-fraud approach.
In response to the problems with monitoring, the idea of developing an ethical culture and an organizational values-first orientation
arose.44 This Article espouses an approach consistent with that orientation, but criticizes the typical method used to create that culture. That
typical approach focuses on articulating standards from top leadership,
yet fails to fully integrate employees in the cultural change effort.45
One of the earliest and still most popular attempts for creating
such a culture is to issue an organizational code of conduct. But culture
or orientation—and a resulting reduction of fraud—does not arise
simply out of issuing an organizational statement or code. In the
ACFE study, 67.2% of nonprofit organizations victimized by fraud had
a code of conduct—the second most prevalent control. Previous ex-
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Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through Organizational
Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 967 (2012); see also Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad
Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC.
75, 85 (2005).
41 See Killingsworth, supra note 40, at 968; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 970-973 (2007).
42 Killingsworth, supra note 40, at 968.
43 Marla Cornelius & Patrick Corvington, Nonprofit Workforce Dynamics, in THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA 639, 642 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that 74% of nonprofit organizations are
operating with expenses under $500,000).
44 CHRISTOPHER A. MYERS, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ANSWER
BOOK §8B2.1 (2010) [hereinafter CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ANSWER BOOK] (“Research has
shown that integrity-based programs that address ethics and culture are more effective than
narrower compliance-based programs in reaching positive outcomes for organizations.”).
45 See, e.g., Daniel Alcott, Preventing and Responding to Fraud and Financial Mismanagement: Not for
Profit – Safeguards, 38 WESTCHESTER B.J. 71, 74 (2012) (“In dealing with fraud, the tone is set at
the top; therefore, the board must set the proper example by designing and enforcing policies
and procedures for management to implement and employees to follow.”).
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Margaret Anne Cook & Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence Behavior, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 619, 625 (1998).
47 Timothy L. Fort, Steps for Building Ethics Programs, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 197, 199-200
(2005).
48 Linda Klebe Trevino et al, (Un)Ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
635, 639 (2014) (discussing Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Bad Apples, Bad Cases, and Bar Barrels:
Meta-Analytic Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work, 95 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1
(2010)).
49 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ANSWER BOOK, supra note 44, at §8B2.1 (“A powerful influencer of behavior in most organizations—sometimes even more powerful than messages or
tone from leadership—is peer pressure.”).
50 Id.
51 Frequency of Anti-Fraud Controls by Type of Victim Organization, ACFE, http://www.acfe.
com/rttn-controls.aspx.
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aminations of codes suggest that, by themselves, codes do not impact
ethical behavior.46 Codes may be important as an articulation of a
company’s ethical orientation, and thus helpful if part of a consistent,
comprehensive approach.47 However, if the organizational response to
potentially unethical behavior does not align with the code, the existence of the code may produce a cynical response, in turn leading to
more unethical behavior.48
While values-based communication and exemplary behavior by
organizational leadership is important to establishing the culture, this
often-espoused “tone at the top” is insufficient because of the distance
between leadership and those at lower rungs of the organization. Between top leadership and most employees lie a number of other potential influencers: lower-level managers and peers. If the “mood in the
middle” and “buzz at the bottom” are not consistent with the tone at
the top, the disconnect can encourage fraudulent behavior.49 Thus, as
will be argued below, in addition to those at the top of the organization,
those in the middle and bottom of the everyday work of the organization must be better integrated into the anti-fraud efforts.50
To be sure, employees have not been entirely left out of current
anti-fraud efforts, although methods that include employees are significantly less prevalent than methods focused on monitors or top leadership. For instance, 37.8% of nonprofit organizations conducted fraud
training for employees, 38.8% provided a reporting hotline, and 45.8%
provided employee support programs.51 Thus, in some organizations,
employees may be the object of education efforts, they may be asked to
report unethical or noncompliant behavior to senior management or
internal auditors, and they may be offered support services to help
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them through difficult personal or household financial situations.52
Through such efforts employees are expected to learn and abide by
rules and guidelines established by management, auditors, or legal authorities. As a result, to the extent that employees are included within
the anti-fraud controls, it is often as the recipients of directives constructed and distributed by others—not as active participants in creating, disseminating, and evaluating the policies themselves.
Yet despite the relative infrequency of including employees in
fraud prevention efforts, employees are the most frequent source for
uncovering fraud. In the ACFE study, in which 81.4% of all organizations (and 77.1% of nonprofit organizations) underwent an external
audit of their financial statement, only 3.0% of frauds were uncovered
by the external audit.53 Other heavily used oversight mechanisms were
more effective (e.g., management review uncovered 16% of frauds; internal audit uncovered 14.4%).54 But employee tips bettered them all.
Employees revealed more than 20% of all frauds—exposing more
frauds more than any other method.55 Employee tips were this effective despite that only 47.8% of companies offered fraud training for
employees and only 54.1% provided a reporting hotline (as noted
above, even less nonprofit organizations provided either training or a
hotline).56
Because of this effectiveness, employers would be advised to implement more hotlines and employee education. That would be a valuable, though incomplete, incorporation of employees into the anti-fraud
efforts. But treating employees merely as recipients of directives misses
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52 See, e.g., Daniel Lucien Buhr, Five Fundamentals for Taking Compliance Management Seriously,
ACC DOCKET, Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 39, 42-44 (including in the “basic structure of a compliance
program” that the company “informs and regularly trains its staff” about the code of conduct
and “ensures that the staff and third parties can contact a reporting body, maintaining anonymity if requested”). Compare William H, Devaney et al., Protecting Your Nonprofit from Embezzlement
& Fraud, VENABLE (Oct. 6, 2010), www.venable.com/nonprofits (discussing ten control
measures to consider), with Jeffrey Tenenbaum & William Devaney, Detecting and Preventing Fraud
and Embezzlement, VENABLE (Mar. 2013), www.venable.com/nonprofits (adding employee training as an eleventh suggested control measure).
53 ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS 2014, supra note 17, at 19 (ACFE report
did not break down the detection method by type of organization).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 19-21 (reporting that 20.6% of fraud initially detected by employee tips.) Moreover,
this likely undercounts the number of tips from employees. Fraud was initially detected by tips
42.2% of the time.While 49% of these tips were identified as coming from employees, a further
14.6% were anonymous; a figure that presumably includes some employees as well. See id.
56 Id. at 31; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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an opportunity to more effectively instill a fraud-free mentality and
drive in the workforce.
Employees should not merely be told what the organization’s values are and how to behave accordingly; instead, they should be given a
participating role in the process of designing, implementing and enforcing the fraud prevention strategy. The next section explores why this is
an effective approach.
B.

Theoretical Support for the Proposed Approach of Empowering Employees
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57 See Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The
Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1295 (2005) (noting the significant
costs of a command-and-control system).
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The important role that employee tips play in exposing fraud is
proof that the success of an anti-fraud strategy depends to a large extent on employee cooperation. Employees must decide whether to participate in a fraud, stand idly by while suspecting a fraud, or act to prevent or stop a fraud. They also make decisions whether to participate
in or allow avoidance of anti-fraud controls. Although employees’ intentions in allowing circumvention of the rules may be innocent (e.g.,
to allow a faster than normal response to a co-worker or third party or
pursue what they believe is a more important organizational end) the
effect may be to provide the opportunity for fraud to occur. Consequently, employees’ understanding of the rationale for the anti-fraud
control mechanisms, their dedication to upholding the integrity of
those measures, and their input in determining when a particular measure could be better designed are critically important to ensure control
effectiveness.
Certainly, surveillance can make an errant employee’s nefarious
plans more difficult to put into action, and the work of internal auditors
and lawyers can be useful in uncovering and investigating suspected
frauds. Proposing that employees be included in anti-fraud efforts does
not mean that these fraud mechanisms and experts should be excluded
from the process. Rather, incorporating employees in crafting and enforcing corporate anti-fraud rules adds a critical and otherwise lacking
component to an anti-fraud program. And, if implemented as suggested in Section III below, this approach would be part of a comprehensive ethics system. It also may enable fewer resources to be used on
enforcing control mechanisms.57

36856-cap_13-3 Sheet No. 42 Side A

08/14/2015 09:37:37

BRADLEY FINALY GALLEY_8.12

2015]

8/12/2015 4:20 PM

EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES

725

Social psychology and organizational behavior research supports
the idea that active employee participation in anti-fraud efforts—
beyond just the occasional employee tip hotline—would be a valuable
addition to a nonprofit organization’s response to economic crime. In
the following sections, this Article explains the two theories supporting
the full incorporation of employees in anti-fraud efforts.
The first theory relates to employee participation as a means to secure each individual’s buy-in to the organization’s goals (one of which
presumably is to prevent the illicit use of organizational funds). Incorporating an employee in relevant processes has a powerful effect on the
employee. When she is empowered through opportunities to participate, she will scrupulously attend to anti-fraud rules and work for compliance by other employees. The second theory relates to the concept
of peer group influence, which helps create a culture of compliance in
the entire workforce. Employees committed to a fraud-free workplace
send a signal to their peers, and that signal influences the behavior of
other workers—making all employees less likely to commit fraud.
i.

Employees Who Participate in Decision-Making Scrupulously
Attend to the Rules and Seek Compliance by Others

58
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Chockolingam Viswesvaran & Deniz S. Ones, Examining the Construct of Organizational Justice: A Meta-Analytic Evaluation of Relations with Work Attitudes and Behaviors, 38 J. BUS. ETHICS 193,
193 (2002).
59 Id.
60 Tom R. Tyler, Justice, in GROUP PROCESSES 111, 124-125 (John M. Levine ed., 2013). The
others are “a neutral forum, trustworthy authorities, and treatment with dignity and respect.” Id.
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Employee participation in fraud-prevention efforts is likely to lead
to positive behaviors, such as meticulous rule-following and internal
whistleblowing, beyond what the organization is able or willing to enforce with sanctions or rewards. The key connection is the role that
employee participation plays in creating procedural justice, which in
turn enhances an employee’s affective commitment to organizational
objectives.
Procedural justice is defined as the perceived fairness of the procedures or means used to determine an outcome.58 Procedural justice is
different from distributive justice, which is concerned with the perceived fairness of the outcomes.59 Participation in decision-making is
vital because it is one of the primary elements that bring about procedural justice.60
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With procedural justice comes an employee’s affective commitment,61 that is, an emotional attachment to and identification with an
organization.62 Because the employee feels attached to the organization
and senses that she belongs, the affectively committed employee wants
the organization to succeed.63 Consequently, an affectively committed
employee seeks to act for the betterment of the organization even when
such behavior is not required or rewarded.64 This includes observing
group rules, even when there is no fear that errant behavior will be detected.65
The link between procedural justice and affective commitment has
been observed in the nonprofit context. In a study of decision-making
within French social enterprises—akin to U.S. nonprofits—a significant
positive relationship between procedural justice and affective commitment was found.66 The process of contributing to organizational decision-making encouraged employees’ commitment to their organization.67
In addition to following rules, an affectively committed employee
is more likely to take voluntary steps to ensure that group resources are
not lost through fraud committed by other employees. For example, an
employee might report that she suspects an ongoing fraud—even
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61 Id. at 119 (“[S]tudies of procedural justice indicate that it plays an important role in motivating commitment to organizations.”); see also Marc Ohana, Decision-Making in Social Enterprises:
Exploring the Link Between Employee Participation and Organizational Commitment, 42 NONPROFIT
&VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1092, 1096, 1100 (2012) (finding that procedural justice was positively related to affective commitment in the context of social enterprises); Viswesvaran & Ones,
supra note 58, at 199 (finding correlation between procedural justice and organizational commitment).
62 John P. Meyer et al., Affective, Continuance, and Normative Commitment to the Organization: A
Meta-Analysis of Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences, 61 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 20, 21 (2002);
accord Ohana, supra note 61, at 1096 .
63 Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 55 (2000).
64 Id.
65 Meyer et al., supra note 62, at 37 (finding a positive correlation between affective commitment and organizational citizenship behaviors, including “compliance/conscientiousness”);
see Philip M. Podsakoff et al., Organizational Citizenship Behaviors: A Critical Review of the Theoretical
and Empirical Literature and Suggestions for Further Research, 26 J. OF MGMT. 513, 517-18 (2000)
(summarizing the Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCB) literature’s understanding of
“organizational compliance” as “capturing a person’s internalization and acceptance of the organization’s rules, regulations, and procedures, which results in a scrupulous adherence to them,
even when no one observes or monitors compliance”).
66 Ohana, supra note 61, at 1100.
67 Ohana, supra note 61, at 1101-02.
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though reporting is not strictly required of her. Ideally, from the organization’s perspective, the employee would report her concerns internally
rather than publicly blowing the whistle, thus allowing the organization
to respond proactively to combat the fraud rather than reacting to an
outside probe by legal authorities or journalists.68 A recent study of
nonprofit organizations found that employees were less likely to believe
that they must publicly blow the whistle if they perceived that their supervisor was “open to their participation in decision-making and relatively democratic in their practices.”69 Thus, an organization that is participatory—one of the key components of procedural justice—is more
likely to be alerted to a potential fraud before public disclosure results
in reputational harm.
Consequently, employee participation should make it more likely
that each individual will abide by the organization’s anti-fraud rules and
policies and encourage them to promote anti-fraud success throughout
the entity, but a final question remains: participation in what? Most
studies look at participation generally in the organization, not participation in any particular strategy or program.70 But beyond including employees in the general decision-making framework of the organization,
this Article proposes that employees participate in designing, implementing, and enforcing anti-fraud measures. An employee’s everyday
work is affected by the construction of rules designed to prevent fraud,
e.g., how much documentation is necessary for expense reimbursement,
what vetting needs to occur before contracting with a new vendor,
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Benisa Berry, Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee Whistleblowing, 16 EMPLOYEE RESPONSIBILITIES & RIGHTS J. 1, 1 (2004) (noting that internal reporting benefits an organization over external whistleblowing because the former “facilitates early
detection of misconduct and creates opportunity for timely investigation and corrective action”).
69 Joyce Rothschild, The Fate of Whistleblowers in Nonprofit Organizations, 42 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 886, 891 (2013).
70 Importantly, this suggests that participation and fairness with respect to anti-fraud
measures cannot be separated out from fairness in the workplace generally. One implication for
nonprofit organizations, which typically pay their employees less than what they could earn in
the private sector, is to consider whether employees perceive that pay decisions are made in a
procedurally just manner. While resource limitations may make salary increases impossible, the
outcome may be less important than the process. See Tyler & Blader, supra note 63, at 10 (stating that “prior research has suggested that procedural justice judgments often have more influence on people’s attitudes and behaviors than do their assessments of their personal selfinterest”). Nonprofit organizations would therefore be well advised to be transparent with their
employees about the financial pressures on the organization and the process used to reach salary and pay decisions, thus contributing to the practice of procedural justice generally.
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what rules apply to working with government officials in developing
countries. It is precisely because the anti-fraud measures impact everyday duties that employees should be included in their construction, dissemination, and prosecution. Developing an employee who will operate ethically even when not watched requires allowing him to
participate in decision-making about his work.71 If the employee understands that the rules and procedures were a product of a fair process
in which he had the opportunity for involvement, he will be more likely
to conform to them and seek to have fellow workers similarly comply.
ii.

Employee Commitment Sends an Influential Peer Message
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71 See Melissa S. Baucus & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, Designing Ethical Organizations: Avoiding the
Long-Term Negative Effects of Rewards and Punishments, 56 J. BUS. ETHICS 355, 363 (2005) (contending that a “necessary characteristic of corporate communities” is allowing employees to participate in the decisions that affect “how their work gets done”).
72 Trevino et al., supra note 48, at 637.
73 See id. (stating that ethical decision-making within organizations implicates influential
“power and authority structures . . . organizational, leader, and peer influences and constraints”).
74 See generally id; see also DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE
LIE TO EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES 237-38 (2012).
75 Kenneth D. Butterfield et al., Moral Awareness in Business Organizations: Influences of IssueRelated and Social Context Factors, 53 HUMAN RELATIONS 981 (2000); Celia Moore & Francesco
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In addition to the enhanced anti-fraud commitment that participation engenders in individual employees, participation sends a powerful
social signal to all employees that fraud is not accepted within the organization. This social signal is critically important to influencing and
directing ethical decision-making because most people look outside
themselves for guidance when making ethical decisions.72 Organizations must recognize the typical appeal to external referents and seek to
influence their personnel’s decision-making accordingly, by providing
markers such as the behavior and language of other people (leaders,
peers) and the establishment of rules (codes, guidance documents, procedures).73
In other words, ethical decisions are not made in a vacuum in
which the actor dispassionately and rationally decides merely between
personal risk and reward. Rather, the decision-maker is influenced by
personal/individual and contextual variables.74 Even the simple awareness of the ethical dimensions of a decision is affected by contextual variables.75 Awareness is theorized to be important for ethical decision-
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Gino, Ethical Adrift: How Others Pull Our Moral Compass from True North, and How We Can Fix It,
33 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 53, 56 (2013).
76 Butterfield, supra note 75, at 982; accord Sean Valentine & Tim Barnett, Perceived Organizational Ethics and the Ethical Decisions of Sales and Marketing Personnel, 27 J. PERS. SELLING & SALES
MGMT. 373, 383 (2007).
77 Moore & Gino, supra note 75, at 56.
78 Butterfield et al., supra note 75, at 1001.
79 Id. at 1008 and Table 3.
80 Id. at 1008 (citing previous studies).
81 Id. at 1001; see also, e.g., Francesco Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 397 (2009) (concluding that: “peer influence is an important factor in unethical behavior).
82 Donald McCabe et al., Cheating in Academic Institutions: A Decade of Research, 11 ETHICS &
BEHAV. 219, 222 (2001).
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making as the first of four steps that lead to an ethical action: (1) moral
awareness, (2) moral judgment, (3) moral intent, and (4) moral action.76
Among relevant variables, social norms (i.e., the behavioral expectations that people hold in a particular context) are a particularly powerful influence on whether the decision-maker is aware or neglectful of
the ethical aspects of a decision.77 In one study, participants were given
two business decision scenarios and tested to see which factors influenced whether they recognized the moral nature of the situation. The
researchers found that when the participants perceived that others in
their organization or profession would see the issue as ethically problematic, the participants themselves were more likely to be aware of and
consider the ethical issues involved.78 Moreover, the effect of this
“perceived social consensus” on participants’ moral awareness was
stronger than other factors.79 Prior studies also support the strength of
perceived social consensus.80 Accordingly, the researchers concluded
that, “although previous normative and descriptive writings have tended to suggest that . . . ethical decision making is an individual or personal process, this research suggests that, in organizational contexts, it
is very much a social process.”81
This socially influenced, ethical decision-making process is particularly shaped by peers: those whom we identify as similar to ourselves.
Across a number of studies that examined cheating in higher education,
the degree to which students perceived that fellow students cheated had
“the most significant relation with student cheating” compared to a
range of other factors, such as the existence of sanctions, the likelihood
of being caught, and disapproval by authority figures.82
The university cheating studies provide a useful analog to fraud
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Donald L. McCabe & Linda Klebe Trevino, Academic Dishonesty: Honor Codes and Other
Contextual Influences, 64 J. HIGHER EDUC. 522, 528, 530-531 (1993).
84 See, e.g., Donald L. McCabe et al., Honor Codes and Other Contextual Influences on Academic
Integrity: A Replication and Extension to Modified Honor Code Settings, 43 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 357,
358, 372 (2002) (“perception of peers’ behavior had the most influence under all three code
conditions”); Donald L. McCabe & Linda Klebe Trevino, Individual and Contextual Influences on
Academic Dishonesty: A Multicampus Investigation, 38 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 379, 387, 391 (1997).
85 See, e.g., McCabe et al., supra note 82, at 223-224.
86 See McCabe et al., Academic Dishonesty in Graduate Business Programs: Prevalence, Causes, and
Proposed Action, 5 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 294, 303-304 (2006).
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committed against nonprofit organizations. Many of the aspects studied in the higher education context are either directly applicable or easily analogized to the organizational context; for example, honor code:
code of conduct; faculty support: management support. And, of
course, the students in those studies go on to populate the nonprofit
organizations that are the concern of this Article. Finally and perhaps
most significantly, the nature of cheating is similar to fraud—in each,
an individual gains in violation of the rules and at the expense of a mission-driven institution.
Across almost two decades of research into cheating, students’
perceptions of peer behavior consistently emerged as the most influential variable affecting cheating. In the initial study, encompassing more
than 6,000 students from thirty-one U.S. colleges and universities, the
effect of variables such as the existence of a honor code, student understanding and acceptance of an academic integrity policy, the certainty of
being reported, and the severity of penalties were measured.83 Subsequent studies focused on potential individual influencers (e.g., age, gender, academic achievement) and contextual influencers (e.g., degree of
faculty support for academic integrity policies).84 Across the studies,
the perception of peer behavior was the most influential factor on
whether students cheated.85
The finding was the same when cheating was investigated among
graduate business school students, a population that has additional
similarities to the workforce because it typically consists of older students with previous work experience who do not live in communal
housing.86 The diffuse community aspect might be expected to lessen
the impact of peer-related contextual factors on cheating, but that was
not the case in this study. For the study’s graduate business school students, the most significant factor in the level of cheating was the per-
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Id. at 299.
Trevino et al., supra note 48, at 642.
89 Francesco Gino & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Dishonesty: When Psychological Closeness Creates Distance from One’s Moral Compass, 119 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 15, 16 (2012).
90 See Id. (identifying ways in which psychological closeness can be brought about).
91 Id. at 21, 23.
92 Id. at 23.
88
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ception of their peers’ academic dishonesty.87
In the organizational context, coworkers make up an important
peer group,88 and, as such, coworkers are likely to share attributes, connections, and identities with each other. Such commonalities influence
ethical decision-making, for good and ill, by bringing about psychological closeness: “feelings of attachment and perceived connection toward
another person or people.”89 Within a nonprofit organization, psychological closeness may be generated through common group membership (as members of the same organization, unit, or department) or
identity (as persons mutually engaged in a particular mission).90
The resulting psychological closeness between coworkers significantly influences behavior, even when the norm for behavior seems
otherwise apparent. For example, a person’s evaluation of the moral
appropriateness of cheating is influenced by whether he feels psychologically close to the cheater. If he feels close to the cheater, he is more
likely to view the behavior as morally acceptable and act likewise. 91 But
there is an upside as well—if the person feels psychologically close to
someone who has acted virtuously, he is more likely to act virtuously.92
Because perceived peer behavior is extremely important in shaping
ethical decision-making, every organization should seek to create and
propagate the (accurate) perception that fraud and other unethical behavior is considered unacceptable by the agents’ relevant peer group.
That perception can be created among the workforce by demonstrating
that employees are devoting their time, knowledge, and effort to combat fraud within the organization. The dedication of employees should
be made evident through formal and informal channels, thus supporting the acculturation of fraud prevention and ethical norms in general
throughout the organization.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNING A FRAUD PREVENTION PROGRAM
The theoretical bases supporting the inclusion of employees in an
organization’s anti-fraud program also provide direction for what that
participation should entail. Organizations characterized by procedural
justice will work to have their employees participate meaningfully in the
process of seeking to prevent fraud. Entities cognizant of the distinct
importance of peers to ethical decision-making will harness the power
of those peer relationships. Additionally, they will provide forums for
the development of ethical leadership among employees. Of course, as
with any ethics effort, the unique attributes of the particular organization must be taken into account when designing or reforming a fraud
prevention program.93
A.

Employees Should Play Meaningful and Visible Roles in Fraud Prevention

C M
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93 See Linda Klebe Trevino & Katherine A. Nelson, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS:
STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT HOW TO DO IT RIGHT 189 (6th ed. 2014) (asserting that changing the
ethical culture requires “an in-depth analysis of the company and its current ethical climate.”).
94 See supra § II.B.i.
95 See Benisa Berry, Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee
Whistleblowing, 16 EMPLOYEE RESP. & RTS. J. 1, 7 (2004) (defining empowerment as “a process
that gives employees both the authority to make decisions and the responsibility for outcomes.”).
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Effectively incorporating employees into organizational anti-fraud
efforts requires that employees participate in those efforts in meaningful and visible ways. For participation to be meaningful, employee
views must be considered (although they do not need to control the
outcome). Employees must be given the opportunity for their ideas to
be heard in the decision-making process.94 Participation becomes empowering when employees are part of the authorized and accountable
anti-fraud decision-making process.95
Consequently, the legal or audit functions (internal or external) or
upper management cannot wholly own the fraud prevention program,
which is not to say that those groups should not play a role. Indeed,
these groups can bring particular and valuable expertise, set the tone,
convene and drive the agenda, and act to prevent possible collusion
among actors. Rather than anti-fraud measures emanating from any
single group, employees should be brought in as co-owners of the fraud
prevention strategy. All employees should be targeted for ideas, feedback, and training and employee representatives should be part of a
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96 See Linda Klebe Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What
Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 147 (1999) (recommending that because of the importance of
establishing an ethical culture, the “responsibility for ethics and compliance management
should be held broadly within the organization”).
97 See supra § II.B.ii.
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standing ethics committee responsible for overseeing ethical issues
throughout the organization.96
In addition to being meaningful, employee participation should be
visible, due to the important role the perception of peer behavior and
attitudes plays in ethical decision-making.97 By making employee commitment observable, organizations allow dissemination of the message
that the employees themselves believe in and are committed to a fraudfree workplace.
The importance of employee-action for successfully preventing
fraud within an entity suggests that such meaningful and visible inclusion be extended to every aspect of the anti-fraud process: design, implementation and enforcement. With respect to design, all employees
should be encouraged to submit their ideas for how to improve antifraud measures, identify procedures that might have gaps, and suggest
where controls might be missing their target or creating unacceptable
and unanticipated problems. The logistics of that process may vary according to the organization’s size, complexity, and geographic reach;
for example, some may rely mainly on anonymous, computerized submission systems while others may convene periodic meetings to review
the procedures. The ethics committee, consisting in part of select employees, would consider these ideas on a regular basis. This review ensures a quality control check, though which ideas are exchanged and
vetted in a transparent way, and demonstrates to all employees that they
are a valued part of the process.
Implementation should include using employees as part of training
efforts. Employees could be identified to help lead periodic, formal
ethics conversations exploring the issues most salient for the personnel
in their areas and in functions that interface with each other. And to
further enhance the visibility of employee participation, the membership of the ethics committee should be prominently stated on all policies and procedures.
Finally, enforcement entails including employees in the investigation of suspected frauds. This presents the most sensitive aspect of
employee participation, given the need to protect those being investi-
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gated and to maintain confidentiality requirements. But select employees can be part of the investigation procedure by, for instance, serving a
term as part of a formally constituted investigation review panel. Proper instruction in the need for confidentiality and treatment as part of
the control group for the investigation should alleviate concerns as to
employee involvement.
B.

Employees Should Be Engaged in Ongoing Conversations About Fraud
Prevention and Ethics

C M
Y K

08/14/2015 09:37:37

98 See Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 25
RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 6 (2003) (stating that when “ethical issues . . . are not perceived or are
subordinated to or reframed as economic, legal, public relations, or other kinds of ‘business’
issues, . . . managers [are] free to engage in amoral reasoning.”).
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In addition to involvement in the mechanisms and formal structures developed to address fraud, formal conversations should be periodically convened and informal conversations encouraged to discuss
ethical questions, including fraud, relevant to the type of work engaged
in by particular employees, the organization, and similar nonprofits.
Engagement in such conversations works to accomplish three goals: (1)
establishing ethics as a relevant and welcomed part of organizational
decision-making; (2) enabling employees to take virtuous action; and (3)
developing ethical leaders within the organization.
First, the simple existence of ethical conversations makes it clear
to employees that their decisions within the workplace should include
ethical considerations. This is critical because decision-making has
been shown to vary depending on how the person frames the issue. If
the decision is perceived to not involve ethical considerations, then the
person is unlikely to take into account ethics into her decision—even
when ethical problems exist.98
Even minimal conversations can have an effect on the way a person frames an issue. In a recent study, participants confronted a “rightwrong” decision, akin to those decisions inherent in employee fraud, by
having the opportunity to tell a lie or truth to a supposed fellow participant. If the participant told a lie, it could result in a financial windfall.
Participants were primed for the decision by engaging in a single email
exchange with a supposed peer (actually a computer program) that either evoked a moral truth-telling norm or a self-interested norm. The
results were significant: participants were four times more likely to tell
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99 Brian C. Gunia et al., Contemplation and Conversation: Subtle Influences on Moral Decision Making, 55 ACAD. MGMT J. 13, 24 (2012).
100 Dennis R. Young, Lester M. Salamon, & Mary Clark Grinsfelder, Commercialization, Social
Ventures, and For-Profit Competition, THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 521 (2d ed. 2012).
101 See supra note 76.
102 MARY C. GENTILE, GIVING VOICE TO VALUES xxxii, 57-58, Appendix C (2010).
103 See supra § II.B.ii.
104 This list corresponds to Stages Four, Five, and Six in Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of
moral development theory.
105 Leslie E. Serkerka, Organizational Ethics Education and Training: A Review of Best Practices and
their Application, 13 INT’L J. TRAINING & DEV. 77, 91 (2009); see Baucus & Beck-Dudley, supra
note 71, at 363.
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the truth when they had a moral exchange than if they had a selfinterested exchange.99 The experiment was limited to a single decision;
organizational conversations likely need to be ongoing and more robust
if the effect is to last. But the idea is important because non-profit organizations cannot assume that their employees intuitively know that
ethical considerations are welcomed in the workplace. This may be
particularly true given the pressures to have nonprofits act more like
businesses,100 which have demonstrated plenty of notable frauds and
ethical lapses in recent years.
Second, conversations make it easier to act once the individual has
identified the action she wants to take. Recall that moral awareness,
judgment, and intent can all exist and still not result in action.101 To
stop fraud, individuals must act, but conversations entered into before a
particular situation arises can make it more likely that they will respond
as needed. That is the conclusion of the Giving Voice to Values program,
founded by the Aspen Institute of Business and Society Program and
Yale School of Management. Wrestling with ethical questions enables
people to act because the conversations demonstrate that they have allies and give opportunity to develop their understanding of how they
would effectively address an unethical situation.102 In short, conversation is preparation.
Finally, conversations are crucial for developing ethical leaders
within the organization. Ethical leaders must be able to engage in ethical reasoning beyond reference to group norms, which, as discussed
above, is how most adults conduct ethical inquiries.103 Such leaders are
therefore important for guiding the organization’s adherence to laws,
socially beneficial principles, and universal values.104
Interpersonal dialog is critical for preparing people for ethical decision-making.105 This is part of the approach at the United States Mili-
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Evan H. Offstein et al, Reconciling Competing Tensions in Ethical Systems: Lessons from the United States Military Academy at West Point, 37 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 617, 618 (2012).
107 Id. at 642-44.
108 Id.
109 Donald L. McCabe & Gary Pavela, New Honor Codes for a New Generation, INSIDE HIGHER
ED. (Mar. 11, 2005), available at https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2005/03/11/pavela1.
110 McCabe et al., supra note 82, at 228-29.
111 Leslie E. Sekerka, Organizational Ethics Education and Training: A Review of Best Practices and
their Application, 13 INT’L J. TRAINING & DEV. 77, 81, 90 (2009) (study of selected organizations
in Silicon Valley).
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tary Academy at West Point, where cadets are both students and employees of the U.S. Army. A recent qualitative study at West Point examined the institution’s ethical system to determine how the components contributed or inhibited the success of the system.106 The study
concluded that West Point seeks to form soldiers who would behave
ethically by exposing past mistakes and encouraging debate, dialogue
and reflection.107 This learning process accepts the tensions inherent in
some of the values espoused, such as loyalty and honor, and seeks to
develop people who can make ethically complex decisions.108
Returning to the studies of cheating within universities, the researchers concluded that the highest cheating levels are “usually found
at colleges that have not engaged their students in active dialogue on
the issue of academic dishonesty—colleges where the academic integrity policy is basically dictated to students and where students play little
or no role in promoting academic integrity or adjudicating suspected
incidents of cheating.”109 Accordingly, the researchers recommended
that institutions consider “creating a ‘hidden curriculum’ in which students not only receive formal ethics instruction but also learn by actively discussing ethical issues and acting on them . . . allowing students to
participate in the many opportunities for teaching and learning about
ethical issues that arise in the day-to-day operations” of the institution.110
In most organizations, such opportunities for ethical learning are
rare. Most employers focus on disseminating applicable rules, policies,
standards, and regulations, rather than “helping people learn and explore ethical frameworks.”111 The need for better fraud prevention
outcomes within nonprofit organizations calls out for introducing ethical conversations in the workplace and incorporating employees
throughout the organization’s anti-fraud efforts.
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CONCLUSION
Including employees in the design, implementation and enforcement of an organization’s anti-fraud strategy demands resources above
what is required for a small group of designated persons—the legal department, the internal audit department, the board—to do so the same.
This Article has not examined all of the costs and benefits of fraud prevention approaches. But given the expense of effective monitoring, the
costs of including more people may be less expensive than purely topdown approaches—even leaving aside potential savings from preventing a fraudulent scheme.
This Article has revealed that employees are often overlooked yet
vitally important to improving fraud outcomes. Empowering employees moves the locus of the anti-fraud measures from someone or something external to the employees themselves—a move towards internalization. Thus, the decision to act in accordance with the rules becomes
a personal decision, reinforced by peer influence, and reduces resistance
to uninspiring “ethical edicts from top management”112 and reliance on
financially- and socially-costly command-and-control systems.113 This
process of internalization may be particularly salient for non-profit
workers, many of whom chose to be part of a cause or mission-driven
body. Given the opportunity, they will likely respond to overtures to
be more integrated into the organization’s governance, allowing the organization to not only improve its anti-fraud efforts, but also refine its
ethical focus and build a more committed workforce.

Timothy Fort, Steps for Building Ethics Programs, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 197, 200 (2005).
Cf. Tyler, supra note 57, at 1295-1296; cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 65
(2006) (“Democratic societies require normative commitment to function effectively. Authorities cannot induce through deterrence alone a level of compliance sufficient for effective social
functioning. Society’s resources are inadequate to such a task and some base of normative
commitment to follow the law is needed.”).
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* Schusterman Visiting Professor of Law at Yale University, and a Senior Research Scholar
in Law at Yale Law School, 2013-15; Visiting Professor, McGill University, Canada (2007-08);
Associate Professor of Civil Procedure and Jewish Law and Director of the Center for the Application of Jewish Law (ISMA), Netanya College Law School, Israel.
** Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University. Head of Conflict Management,
Resolution and Negotiation Program, Bar-Ilan University. Visiting Associate Professor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Fordham Law School (2013).
The article has been presented at the Yale Dispute Resolution Workshop, Yale Law
School November 2014. Our thanks to the participants of the workshop, and to Noah Messing,
Aharon Barak, Charlie Pillsbury and Judith Resnik for their valuable comments.
1 See, e.g., Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, The Multi-Tasking Judge: Comparative Judicial
Dispute Resolution (2013) [hereinafter The Multi-Tasking Judge].
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The adjudicative system is undergoing significant change as a result of the widespread introduction of various judicial dispute resolution (JDR) modes, which employ innovative hybrid methods of adjudicative decision making, combining elements of adjudication with those
of alternatives dispute resolution (ADR).1 This trend may be viewed in
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light of what Judith Resnik recently defined as “the privatization of
process” — the reconceptualizing of adjudication by introducing the
multitasking judge who manages, settles, mediates, and promotes new
forms of alternative dispute resolution.2 This phenomenon corresponds with the fact that “most cases settle”3 and that the traditional
trial is vanishing (“trial as error”).4 Hybrid methods of judicial dispute
resolution exist in many countries.5 An interesting hybrid method is
used in Delaware: a state-sponsored arbitration program—a binding
arbitration before a judge that takes place in a courtroom—which is an
alternative to trial for resolving certain kinds of (business) disputes.6
Although Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitrations program share characteristics such as informality, flexibility, and limited review with private
arbitrations, they differ fundamentally from other arbitrations because
they are conducted before active judges in a courthouse,7 because they
result in a binding order of the Chancery Court, and because they allow
only limited right of appeal. Delaware’s special arbitration program was
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2 Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 162 U. Penn L. Rev. 1793, 1802-1814 (2014) (arguing that the new forms of ADR
should be understood as a “New Private Process”).
3 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements,
46 Stanford L. Rev. 1339 (1994) [hereinafter “Most Cases Settle”].
4 Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 924 (2000).
5 The various JDR modes and processes used in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta
have stimulated a great deal of interest and provide a good example for judges’ new roles. See,
e.g., John D. Rooke, The Multi-Door Courthouse is Open in Alberta: Judicial Dispute Resolution is Instituted in the Court of Queen’s Bench, in The Multi-Tasking Judge, supra note 1. This JDR program introduces a voluntary and consensual process whereby parties to a dispute, following the filing
of an action in the court, seek the assistance of a JDR justice to help settle the dispute before
trial in a mini-trial, facilitative or evaluative mediation or binding JDR. In the German legal tradition there are methods of judging and conciliation (“Richten oder Schlichten”), which also
consist of hybrid forms containing elements of judging as well as elements of conciliation, for
example the arbitration procedure. See Peter Collin, Judging and Conciliation – Differentiations and
Complementarities 10, Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No.
2013-04 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256508. For examples from other countries, especially China and Canada see Part II of The Multi-Tasking Judge (Global Practices of Judicial Dispute Resolution). See also infra note 18.
6 The proceeding of Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration is governed both by statute
and by the Rules of the Delaware Court of Chancery. See 10 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10, § 349
(2009); Del. Ch. R. 96-98.
7 In Common law judges may sit as arbitrators, in special circumstances. See, e.g., DAVID
ST. JOHN SUTTON & JUDITH GILL, 4 RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION 25-28 (22nd ed. 2003) (Indicating
that under English law, in special circumstances, a judge of the Commercial Court or the Technology and Construction Court may accept appointment as arbitrator).
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See Delaware Coalition for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013) cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
9 Id. at 22 (Judge Sloviter agrees with Judge Roth on the virtues of arbitration, and appreciates the difference between adjudication and arbitration, i.e., “that a judge in a judicial proceeding derives her authority from coercive power of the state, while a judge serving as an arbitrator
derives her authority from the consent of the parties.”).
10 See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure 348 (2001); Neil Andrews, Principles of
Civil Procedure 551-552 (1994).
11 Del. Ch. R. 98(f)(1).
12 SUTTON & GILL, supra note 7, at 165-66.
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recently challenged by the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.8
Although the Court appreciated some of the virtues of Delaware’s
state-sponsored arbitration,9 its decision was that the arbitration process, which permits the proceedings to be kept confidential, violates the
US Constitution’s First Amendment right of access of the public to civil trials, which applies to Delaware’s proceedings.
Our paper calls to rethink the Delaware decision while discussing
an innovative perspective which was not considered by the court in its
decision. Many pointed out the main merits of arbitration (speed,
cheapness, secrecy, informality, expertise etc.) when compared with
proceedings before the ordinary courts.10 We would like to point out
some other merits of state sponsored hybrid judicial dispute resolution
processes, such as Delaware’s arbitration program, by using the JDR
processes as an opportunity to apply a broader scheme of judicial discretion. Such a discretion, we suggest, combines formal legal considerations with other considerations such as equity, peace, conflict resolution and social justice. The possibility of a broad judicial discretion,
based on equity and justice, authorized by parties consent is found in
Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program in which the Chancery
Court judge presiding over the proceedings “[m]ay grant any remedy or
relief that [s/he] deems just and equitable and within the scope of any
applicable agreement of the parties.”11 This possibility of a broad judicial discretion is found in the Common law concept of “equity” clauses,
which allows the arbitral tribunal, when specifically instructed by the
arbitration agreement, to decide the dispute on some basis other than
the strict law.12
In general, arbitration is distinguished from adjudication in that
the hearings are often more informal in arbitration than in court adjudication, and arbitrators are not required to explain how their rulings are
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in accordance with prior formal legal principles.13 As a consequence,
both the sources of decisions and the outcomes of the arbitration may
be at variance with what adjudication might have constructed. Furthermore, while adjudication is often described as a win/lose activity,
decisions by some arbitration programs often entail compromises.14
In light of the creation of the new various judicial dispute resolution methods, among them Delaware’s arbitration program, a jurisprudential account of these methods is required. The emerging innovative
practices require a coherent theory that focuses on the inherent tension
between aspects of adjudication and ADR, and that proposes a structured model of judicial discretion in these methods. Not only is such a
theory able to explain existing practices, but it will also demonstrate
how they can provide reconstructive solutions to basic limitations of
legal rules and conventional legal decision making. This paper introduces such a jurisprudential analysis while discussing the merits of one
unique version of judicial dispute resolution: “court arbitration compromise verdicts”. This version is an adjudication conducted by a
judge-arbitrator presiding in the case to terminate a conflict by rendering a final decision based on “compromise considerations”.15 Such an
activity combines authority with consent in a unique way, in which the
judge-arbitrator decides cases based on considerations that deviate from
the regular legal rules, and this imposition is validated by the parties’
prior consent.16 Court compromise verdicts are not merely a matter of
theory. They are a matter of necessity on terms of the high rate of settlement and the pressure on judges to reach them.17 In some common
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OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 44 (2003).
Id. at 45-46 (dealing with the difference between court-annexed arbitration and regular adjudication).
15 Martin P. Golding, The Nature of Compromise: A Preliminary Inquiry, in COMPROMISE IN
ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 4, 20-22 (James R. Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979)
[hererinafter Golding, Compromise]. On the law of settlement in general see, e.g., FISS &
RESNIK, supra note 13, at 633-754.
16 It should be noted that although the compromise consent verdicts discussed in this paper
are not absolutely identical to the Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration program, they do have
much in common in the sense that they all combine consent and adjudication, resulting in a
binding judicial decision. The Delaware’s arbitration processes may have been inspired by the
ideas expressed below.
17 “Most cases settle”, and increasing obligations of judges to press parties toward settlement are found in rules and policy statements of the judiciary in common law systems, as well
as phrases in judicial reported decisions such as “a bad settlement is almost always better than a
good trial,” which resembles the view of “trial as error.” See Resnik, supra note 4, at 926.
14
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Some of the methods of the Alberta JDR and Delaware’s arbitration program were mentioned above In Delaware there is a specific process for a settlement option. See Del. Ch. R.
98(e). A compromise consent verdict method is found in another legal system based on the
common law tradition. In Israel, with the enactment of sec. 79A of the Courts Law [New Version] 1984 by virtue of the Courts (Amendment no. 15) Law, 1992, a court hearing a civil matter was given the authority to rule, in respect of the matter before it in whole or in part, by way
of compromise, provided that it obtained the consent of the parties.
19 Such as those indicated in the Alberta Rules of Court. See Rooke, supra note 5, at 181.
20 See, e.g., John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise – The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. Rev. 750 (1964) [hereinafter Coons, Compromise]; John E. Coons, Compromise
as Precise Justice, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 250 (1980) [hereinafter Coons, Precise Justice]; J. Jaconelli,
Solomonic Justice and Common Law, 12 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 480 (1992) [hereinafter Jaconelli,
Solominic Justise]; M. Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts 89 Cal. L. Rev.
231 (2001).
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law systems, a compromise consent verdict process, which is a sort of
court arbitration, is available as part of the binding judicial dispute resolution methods.18
The participating parties in a judicial dispute resolution process in
general, and a court arbitration by compromise in particular, may agree
on the rules to be followed in the process, including rules19 regarding
the nature of the process, the matters constituting the subject of the
process, the manner in which the process will be conducted, the role of
the judge and any outcome expected of that role, and any practice or
procedure related to the process. The present article is focused more
on the role of the judge-arbitrator, the outcome of the compromise—
the judicial decision sharing/dividing the pie amongst the parties—and
the judicial considerations and discretion leading to the outcome rather
than the practice or procedure relating to the process.
Most of those who write on the subject of judicial dispute resolution and compromise verdicts20 have ignored the advantages of the
possibility of combining the element of consent with the element of authority to grant the court the power to decide by way of compromise.
Articulating the advantages of this court arbitration process of compromise verdicts, and the attempt to regulate and conceptualize the
process and determine its bounds, is the challenge facing the authors of
this article. The article elaborates a structured hybrid vision of modes
of compromise as forms of justice, which transcend efficiency and procedural concerns. It defines new modes of arbitration which are guided
by variety of standards. The innovative modes of compromise proposed in this paper contribute to a more pluralistic notion of judicial
discretion which enriches the boundaries of adjudication.
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21 On the connection between democracy and compromise see Arthur Kuflik, Morality and
Compromise, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS, supra note 15, at 38, 41 [hereinafter
Kuflik, Compromise].
22 The party-preference arguments are among the major reasons for saying that compromises are good. See “Most Cases Settle”, supra note 3, at 1350.
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The use of different modes of compromise consent verdicts suggested in the present article is capable of promoting greater justice (precise justice, social justice and equity) by integrating new considerations
into judges’ discretion. With more regulated forms of compromise offered to the parties, who have the freedom to choose between different
court arbitration modes of compromise,21 the legal system may become
more pluralistic and nuanced when responding to the complexity of legal cases.
In cases of compromise verdicts it appears that the parties seek a
decision based not only on legal arguments; they seem rather to be interested in other modes of decision making, based on conflict analysis,
social justice or other considerations. This new pluralistic mode of judicial performance preserves the authoritative pre-emptive effect while
expanding the variety of schemes from which the parties can choose.22
In this paper we offer a model for formulating the court’s discretion in court arbitration consent compromise verdicts by suggesting
several modes of compromise which reflect and integrate various interests and policy considerations. These modes are based on clear guidelines and reflect considerations of law, justice, efficiency as well as principles of negotiation.
The first mode reflects the existing situation: Compromise as a shortcut and prediction. The usual way of understanding judicial actions aimed
at compromise is as an attempt to arrive at an approximate decision in
the case without the need to conduct the case in its entirety. The judges-arbitrators assess the case and its value, and accordingly decide
(when the parties authorize them to do so) with a ruling that in their estimation is close to what would have been the outcome had the case
been conducted in its entirety. Such an attempt focuses on quick and
efficient determination of the superficial legal dispute, and does not
seek to resolve it in a deep manner. This article will not deal with the
mode of compromise as a shortcut and a prediction; rather, it will deal
primarily with four other innovative modes that present additional possible uses of the process of compromise. These diverse tracks of decision making can be regulated and encouraged institutionally, and will
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enhance legal pluralism. Our article will deal with the conceptualization
of the following four modes of compromise verdicts:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Compromise as conflict/dispute resolution
Compromise as precise justice
Compromise as Equity
Compromise as social justice

Section I will present, in a general manner, the four modes of
compromise verdicts. The other chapters will discuss in detail each of
the four modes. Section II will deal with compromise as conflict resolution. Section III will deal with compromise as precise justice. Section
IV will deal with compromise as Equity, and Section V will deal with
compromise as social justice. The last chapter of the article is a conclusion.
I. FOUR MODES OF COMPROMISE

C M
Y K

See generally Coons, Precise Justice, supra note 20.
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When must the court arbitrator decide on the basis of the special
considerations of compromise and deviate from decision making on
the basis of substantive law?
We suggest four modes of court arbitration by compromise as follows:
1. Compromise as a hybrid process that combines judicial authority with
modes of conflict resolution: Because judges are faced with disputes whose
complex nature usually extends beyond the confines of the pleadings
and reaches their courtroom, it is to be assumed that their activity is not
exhausted by mere prediction, even if it is declared to be such. Judges
who conduct negotiations in the courtroom, attempt to mediate, conduct dialogue or introduce conciliatory practices usually do so alongside
their authority to decide on the dispute.
2. Compromise as precise justice: Compromise can provide a philosophical answer to situations in which justice according to the law is
unattainable in principle. These are situations in which the idea of
“such is the law, no matter the consequences” or “winner takes all” are
fundamentally inappropriate for the legal or factual situation.23 From a
jurisprudential point of view, too, compromise is able to offer more
precise justice, which can answer theoretical criticism that has been lev-
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See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1978).
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Legal disputes are usually framed as narrow controversies about
facts and norms, which call for strict assignment of rights by judges
through reference to reason and law.24 The conflicts which underlie legal disputes are usually much broader than what appear as the controversies in courts, and they involve economic, emotional, cultural and
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elled at the law.
3.
Compromise as Equity: The tension between equity and formal
rules exists mainly when a decision by way of equity is imposed upon
the parties without their prior consent, whereas they expect a purely legal solution. In such cases, equity may indeed interfere with stability
and equality before the law. It may be considered arbitrary and as causing instability in the system. There is no room for such a concern, according to our view, when the parties have agreed in advance to an equity-based decision. In such cases parties ask for rules which fit the
unique nature of their conflict.
4. Compromise as a balancing of legal rulings with considerations of social
justice: Implementation of the law is also liable to be fundamentally
problematic when the law appears to be clear and certain but its implementation appears to be unjust. Legal decision making may sometimes harm the weak party, or a one-time litigant as opposed to a seasoned one, and invoking compromise verdicts may well correct the
absence of social justice by means of a verdict that combines these considerations.
As long as the parties approach the court having agreed to reach
an arbitration decision by way of compromise they should again be offered various structured alternatives for reaching a decision. It is important that the parties and the court agree on the nature of the compromise and choose one of the aforementioned four modes of
compromise in a way that reflects informed consent and choice. The
parties may also choose a mixture of the modes, such as compromise
focused on interests (mode 1) and social justice (mode 4). They may
also indicate the weight of each of the compromise considerations
We will now discuss each of these four modes of compromise
separately, and present a structured court arbitration process of proper
judicial discretion.

36856-cap_13-3 Sheet No. 53 Side A

08/14/2015 09:37:37

SINAI FINAL GALLEY)

2015]

8/12/2015 4:35 PM

COURT ARBITRATION BY COMPROMISE

747

other various aspects which cannot be captured through legal lenses.25
The interest in the broader picture of legal conflicts goes together with
an effort to engage deeply in their constructive transformation. It has
its roots in the ADR movement, and continues with contemporary innovations referring to judging, lawyering and institutional reforms. New
movements such as the Therapeutic Jurisprudence Movement emphasize the therapeutic and managerial aspects of judges’ and lawyers’ activities.26 New institutional reforms such as the establishment of Problem-Solving Courts propose structural methods to address the
complexity of some legal (mostly criminal) conflicts in ways which affect the roles of judges and lawyers.27 Innovations in conflictresolution judging such as “solution-based judging”28 and “procedural
justice”29 approaches flourish in Australia and the US and offer judges
new roles when dealing with criminal and civil conflicts. In Alberta
Canada, the notion of judicial dispute resolution (JDR) has been introduced to regulate the role of judges in reaching settlement, while possibly addressing some aspects of the broadest conflicts.30 These innovations and reforms remain on the margins and so far, no explicit
discussion has been devoted to the judges’ role in resolving conflicts.
The pursuit of settlement rather than a deep constructive transformation of the conflict at hand is the prevailing goal according to cur25
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The distinction between “disputes” and “conflicts” is defined by John Burton, one of the
founding fathers of the field of Conflict Resolution in the following way: “A generalization
would be that disputes which are confined to interpretations of documents, and disputes over
material interests in respect of which there are consensus property norms, fall within a traditional legal framework. Conflicts which involve non-negotiable human needs must be subject to
conflict resolution processes. These would include many cases of crime and violence”. See John
W. Burton, Violence Explained: The sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention 97 (1997). In our discussion a legal dispute is the narrow framing of a broader conflict
which is based on various interests and needs which are not fully reflected in the claims before
the courts. Conflicts are many times polycentric. See Fuller, supra note 24, at 371-72.
26 See generally BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (2003).
27 Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J.
1055 (2002); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an
Effective Innovation, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1285 (2000).
28 MICHAEL KING, SOLUTION FOCUSED JUDGING BENCH BOOK (2009), available at
http://www.aija.org.au/Solution%20Focused%20BB/SFJ%20BB.pdf.
29 The Journal of American Judges Association, A Special Issue on Procedural Justice, 44 Court
Rev (2007-2008), available at aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr44-1/CR44-1-2.pdf.
30 The Multi-Tasking Judge, supra note 1, at 157-80. See also JUSTICE JOHN A. AGRIOS, A
HANDBOOK ON JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CANADIAN LAWYERS 7 (2004), available at
http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/id/1378.
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31 The role of lawyers as resolving conflicts, both in criminal and civil cases, has been discussed as part of the spread of ADR and other movements, but judges were considered as
more bounded by legal constraints and as striving for compromise in the shadow of the judicial
prediction.
32 Kuflik, Compromise, supra note 21, at 38, 51 (1979).
33 Id.
34 Although the parties failed to reach a settlement on their own, Kuflik argues that the
agreement to submit the matter to the judgment of a disinterested third party (the judge or arbitrator) could well constitute a significant compromise in its own right: “first, the parties concede, in effect, that they are not the best judges of their own dispute; second, they affirm that
they are prepared to make concessions to one another if, in the considered judgment of a competent judge, that is what they ought to do.”
35 Kuflik, Compromise, supra note 21, at 53 (1979).
36 Indeed, as stated by Kuflik, “people cannot always work out their differences on their
own. But even when negotiations fail to produce the terms of settlement, the parties may come
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rent regulation of judicial activities.31
As Kuflik suggests, compromise has a broader sense than regular
adjudication (or prediction of the adjudicative outcome).32 In regular
adjudication the judge considers a matter that happens to be a dispute,
leaving aside any consideration of the fact that there is an underlying
conflict; in a compromise, however, additional considerations are
weighed. When an issue is in conflict, and a compromise method is
used, “there is more to be considered than the issue itself—for example, the importance of peace, the presumption against settling matters
by force, the intrinsic good of participating in a process in which each
side must hear the other side and try to see matters from the other’s
point of view.”33 Even if the regular judicial activity ought to remain
focused upon reaching settlement, which relates more to the legal dispute, we argue that with parties’ consent and through the use of compromise verdicts, various considerations of conflict resolution can become part of the judicial enterprise.
This chapter assumes that when a judge-arbitrator decides cases by
compromise she may use various conflict resolution methods. It also
assumes that, based on the parties’ consent,34 judges can expand the horizons of their judicial work in order to capture some of the various
contexts which characterize the conflict before them.35 This means that
after the parties have failed to reach settlement or mediation agreement
outside the court, and after the efforts of judges to help them settle in
the courtroom (in a settlement conference) or to mediate between them
have not succeeded, judges can use their authority, combined with the
explicit consent of the parties, 36 to incorporate conflict resolution con-
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siderations into their decision in a court arbitration process.37 Such an
authorization will redirect the judge’s broad discretion as to the use of
legal procedure and legal rules and will enable her to focus on the conflict aspects of the case. The unique consent-based adjudication which
is not bound by the classic perception of rational, external balancing of
parties’ claims through legal principles (based on rights only) may produce new and interesting roles for judges in promoting the resolution
of conflicts.
A.

Five Types of Arbitration

Differentiating between outcome and process when dealing with
compromise is important and useful.38 Conflict resolution studies and
ADR literature offer modes of transforming conflicts, and we would
like to use common alternatives to adjudication as relevant for compromise consent verdicts and as helpful tools for judges to promote
constructive reconstructions of conflicts. Compromise settlements can
be reached in two ways—by negotiation or by arbitration.39 A negotiated settlement will sometimes involve services if a mediator—someone
who has no binding authority (but who acts as a go-between). Arbitration may be take undertaken either by a person who has been selected
by the parties themselves or, as in the concern of the present article, by

08/14/2015 09:37:37
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away convinced that a compromise solution is in order. For it is often easier to acknowledge
that what others have to say has some merit and even to concede that one’s own view is not
immune to reasonable criticism than to see just how competing claims ought to be adjusted. So
although an agreement on the substance of the matter is not immediately forthcoming there
may yet be a mutually agreeable third party whose informed, impartial, and sympathetic concern
commands the respect of all sides.” Id.
37 It should be noticed, as asserted by Kuflik, that in some cases, even if the parties should
manage to reach a settlement on their own, “there is some danger that it will be a settlement of
the wrong sort.” Id. “The parties to a dispute are sometimes simply too biased by their own involvement in the matter to be able to give each other a fair hearing,” and therefore “they are
liable to take one another’s strengths and weaknesses more seriously than their reasons and arguments.” Id. In such cases, argues Kuflik, “one hopes that the balance of morality relevant
considerations, and not the balance of force, will be more nearly reflected in the judgment of a
disinterested third party.” Id.
38 Golding, Compromise, supra note 15, at 7 (distinguishing between the end-state and the
process. The first looks to the result or outcome and tries to see how it compares with the original situation for which it is alleged to be a compromise. The second looks to ways and means,
the methods by which the result is reached, and it characterizes the result as a compromise in
virtue of the process by which it is achieved).
39 For a discussion of the methods of settlements: arbitration vs. negotiation see Kuflik,
Compromise, supra note 21, at 52-55.
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40 The following types of arbitration may be used in legal systems which have a statesponsored arbitration program (such as in Delaware).
41 STEPHEN B GOLDBERG, FRANK A SANDER & NANCY H ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 225 (1992).
42 Id. at 223-24.
43 Frank A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1 (2006). The authors in this paper suggest a third question which is related to conflict qualities but for the sake
of this form of arbitration we find it less relevant.
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someone, a judge in a court, who acts under authority of the state. Parties’ authorization for conflict resolution by a court arbitration in a way
of compromise can be regulated and may include explicit reference to a
closed list of hybrids and types of arbitration such as the following:40
Arbitration under a high-low contract: Parties in this arbitration try to
minimize the risk in the outcome by providing a high and a low limit to
the judge’s decision. The process reduces the risk to both sides by
converting a “win-lose” situation into a “partial-win partial-lose” situation.41
Final offer Arbitration: This method helps to encourage creative and
collaborative thinking and here the arbitrator may not compromise but
must, rather, choose the final offer of either one party or the other.
This should advance the prospects of successful bargaining. The parties, knowing that the arbitrator cannot compromise, are likely to assume that he will select the more reasonable offer.42 In legal cases,
judges can offer parties such a process when opportunities for collaborative thinking seem possible but the parties cannot reach agreement by
themselves.
Arbitration based on analysis of interests and barriers: This method of arbitration is the most innovative and the least explored judicial activity in
promoting settlement. It may also be considered as the most intriguing
and inspiring role of judges in imposing compromise. Judges can function, with the parties’ consent, as experts in conflict resolution, and can
impose genuine solutions based on conflict resolution considerations
when exercising their judicial role. Typical analysis of conflict resolution will typically include two types of questions:43
What are the interests/goals of the parties? In conflict resolution
literature the interests are “the secret movers” behind the legal positions and therefore, an important question which a judge may ask the
parties when the investigating the core of the conflict is “why?” Why
do you claim you are entitled to a certain outcome? What is important
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for you and what underlies your positions in the way they are framed
before the court? Parties may care about various interests such as
speed, privacy, public vindication, maintaining relationships, improving
understanding of conflict, creating new solutions and so forth. Interests can be addressed.
What are the impediments which prevent the parties from resolving this conflict by themselves? Common barriers are identified in conflict resolution literature as: poor communication, the need to express
emotions, different views of facts/norms, important principles, the
jackpot syndrome; psychological barriers, unrealistic expectations and
so forth.
Using conflict resolution considerations to adjudicate a legal case
is not always possible. If some of the interests or needs of the parties
are related to the processing of their case, and they need communication, apology or active listening in order to deal effectively with their
conflict, an authoritative decision may not suffice to answer these
needs. The same is true in relation to impediments to settlement,
which sometimes depend on subjective perceptions such as optimistic
overconfidence which judges cannot truly overcome. In some cases,
such as communication problems, arbitration and adjudication are not
the right processes for overcoming the difficulty. Nevertheless, our
claim is that awareness of such considerations and incorporation of
some of them into court arbitration compromise verdicts, even if only
as relevant considerations that are mentioned within the written decision, may encourage more conflict resolution outside the courtroom.
Judges may write in such hybrid decisions that they perceive the conflict as reflecting a lack of communication or involving diverse subjective perspectives of facts which can be bridged, and try to decide based
on a more nuanced narrative of the facts. They can also emphasize the
need of one party for acknowledgement and give it to her in their writing without jeopardizing neutrality or displaying bias. Such decisions
can promote peace since they are oriented towards achieving such a
goal. The actual outcome may be splitting the difference, but the argumentation may be based on conflict resolution considerations which
are intended to bring the parties closer to each other.
Med-arb.: This is a special framework for reaching a verdict,
whereby the parties begin mediation on the basis of interests, and if the
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GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 41, at 226-27.
Id. at 228.
Howard Raiffa, Post Settlement-Settlement, 1 Negotiation J. 9 (1985).
Jaconelli, Solominic Justice, supra note 20, at 484.
Id. at 484, n. 17.
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process fails, arbitration follows on the basis of rights.44 In this way,
the parties know that if they cannot solve the case on their own, they
will be given a solution based on rights, which was drafted at the beginning of the procedure. This process, when conducted in court, will
provide the parties with assurance that even if the mediation does not
succeed, they will have the benefit of an authoritative decision which
resolves the conflict, or at least puts an end to the legal dispute. The
problem with such a process is that it usually discourages parties from
speaking openly about their interests and from revealing information,
since they know that a judge will decide the case and are afraid to be
taken advantage of by the other party, who will not reveal her own interests and will claim for the value they created without offering anything on her part. To overcome such an inclination, an alternative process of arb-med was developed.
Arb-med.: This is a process in which the court rules based on rights,
but keeps the decision concealed and conducts negotiations to try to
bring the parties to an agreement.45 The parties know that they have a
solution if they cannot reach an agreement, but they are not afraid to
cooperate because even if their concealed interests are revealed, the decision based on their rights has already been made and is not affected
by this information. In this case the first decision may be a predictionbased analysis of the case based on a short presentation. The later stage
will be an open-ended discussion of the complexities of the case, including interests, emotions and relationships. Parties can freely develop
a nuanced constructive solution while remaining assured that a fixed solution is at hand if they fail to reach it. This process has similarities
with “post-settlement-settlements” as described by Howard Raiffa.46
Indeed, as Jaconnelli writes in his “Solomonic Justice and Common Law” article, “adjudication and conciliation, at any rate as far as
modern legal systems are concerned, are entirely distinct processes.”47
He comments, however, that there are societies “where the function of
the judge is conceived as conciliatory; that is, to effect a compromise
between litigants in the interest of retaining intact the web of social relationships.”48 Surprisingly or not, an excellent example of a legal sys-
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tem that combines adjudication and conciliation is perhaps King Solomon’s Jewish legal tradition.
B.

Compromise as a Peace Adjudication Process

See, e.g., MENACHEM ELON, Compromise, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 570-73 (1975).
B.T. Sanhedrin 6b.
51 Itay E. Lipshits, ‘P’shara’ in Jewish Law 137 (July 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Bar-Ilan University Ramat-Gan, Israel) (on file with author).
50
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In the modern theoretical literature dealing with compromise verdicts, the term “Solomonic justice” appears frequently, referring to the
biblical story recounting the manner of judgment of Solomon, King of
the Jews. Now, it appears that the famous biblical story about King
Solomon’s ruling does not refer to the compromise consent verdict discussed in this article, but undoubtedly it is possible to find in the classical Jewish sources very extensive discussions about the process of judicial compromise verdicts.49 An analysis of several of these sources,
which will be undertaken in the present section, will afford us a better
understanding of the manner in which the compromise may be used as
a peace adjudication process.
According to Jewish law, one of the goals of compromise is to
make peace between the parties. Compromise is defined in the Talmud
as “law making which contains peace,50 though it may seem the combination of law and peace is inherently contradictory. On the one hand
there is the familiar discourse of rights so common to legal thinking.
Such a discourse differentiates between the parties and posits the
boundaries between them as the subject for authoritative decision. On
the other hand there is the discourse of peace which aims at reconciliation, connection and collaboration, without searching for the ultimate
truth or the right argument. Peace, in that sense, is a separate category
from law. 51 In order to promote peace, personal involvement of parties
is required, subjective impressions need to be transformed, engagement
in constructive interactions is needed and deep emphasis on relationship, interests and emotional acknowledgement is encouraged. Aspiration for peace is not usually a goal in itself in law making, and only
“public order” is legitimate cause for modifying strict legal applications.
Peace, according to Lifshitz, compensates for inherent gaps within law.
It enables people to waive their rights or to acquire rights which they
do not have, not only for the sake of public order, but to overcome a
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bias or distortion within the law itself. Peace considerations include
fraternity, friendship, relationship, and trust.52 Based on the parties’
consent, judges can incorporate peace considerations into their decision, or they can promote a conflict resolution process or a peaceoriented outcome within conference settlement.
Rabbi Abraham Itzhak Hakohen Kook (1865-1935), the first
Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of the Land of Israel, argued that as a matter
of legal policy, the court may incorporate peace considerations into its
decision in cases where, in its opinion, ruling by law may not resolve
the conflict.53 If a legal decision based on the law is liable to leave bitterness and hostility between the parties, a peace-oriented legal decision
should aspire to avoid these outcomes. Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berlin (Lithuania, 19th century) wrote in the same spirit, saying that if law
cannot bring peace to the conflict, a compromise decision is sometimes
desirable.54 His decision related to a public controversy between two
communities who had an argument based on ethnic differences. Berlin
realized that deciding by law would not resolve the conflict and bring
peace and tolerance between the communities in the multicultural society, and therefore he deviated from the law and rendered a compromise
verdict. The same ruling was given in a case involving young orphans.
The goal of “reducing the conflict” 55 was mentioned as being in the
best interest of the orphans, who would have an on-going relationship
throughout their lives.
III. COMPROMISE AS PRECISE JUSTICE
Court Imposed Compromise as “Precise Justice” – Major Arguments and
Difficulties

In legal theory court compromise verdicts or court imposed compromise have been praised by some scholars as a more justified method
which overcomes the traditional dichotomic all-or-nothing or “winner
takes all” method of judicial decision making. Some perceive the merits
of the court imposed compromise as reflecting “Solomonic justice”56
and some have viewed compromise as “precise justice”, emphasizing
52

54
55
56

Id. at 133.
Responsa Orah Mishpat, H.M. 1, s.v. vehine be’inyan.
Responsa Meshiv Davar 3:10 (Jerusalem, 1968).
Sh.Ar. H.M. 12:3.
See Jaconelli, Solominic Justice, supra note 20.
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See Coons, Compromise, supra note 20; Coons, Precise Justice, supra note 20.
See Golding, Compromise, supra note 15, at 21.
59 See Jaconelli, Solominic Justice, supra note 20 at 485.
60 In this sense, compromise verdicts can provide a reconstructive answer to the critique of
legal formalism.
61 See Abramowicz, supra note 20.
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the element of equality.57 According to this view there are cases in
which judges should render a court imposed compromise as the preferred and more justified legal resolution of the dispute. Indeed, there
are cases, especially if the law and the facts in the case are unclear,
where there may be sound reasons of policy and justice for splitting the
difference between the parties.58 Parties in those cases may be considered as having the right to receive a compromise verdict. If this is the
case, argues Joseph Jaconelli, we are dealing “not with compromise of
one’s legal right, but rather with compromise as being one’s legal right.”59
These arguments depict the court imposed compromise as a more
accurate decision making process in a world in which dichotomic decisions are not always possible. They posit decisions by compromise as a
deep answer to critical approaches in law, such as Legal Realism and
Critical legal studies, which have challenged the objectivity of legal decision making by referring to the indeterminacy of legal rules and to the
social and economic barriers which they reinforce.60
This approach in favor of court imposed compromise and various
versions of it, has challenged the conventional dichotomic approach to
legal decision making and has evoked rich discussions among scholars,
who have pointed to some downsides of the new concept. Some have
criticized the compromise verdicts approach by invoking utilitarian
considerations. Others have appealed to justice or due process. Even
some of the proponents of court imposed compromise verdicts have
developed some modified and narrower notions of such verdicts,
sometimes in response to the criticism against them. Under such modified versions, courts may use this mode of decision making only for
very specific cases, whereas in other cases the traditional dichotomic
decision making method will apply. Abramowitz, for example, has offered an intermediate model of a “system of mixed verdict”, which
benefits from the relative advantages of both modes of decision making
– dichotomic and compromise alike.61 He offered a scheme of analysis
to choose among the modes of decision making in different cases. According to his suggestion, the dichotomic method should be applied

58
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when there is no doubt about the plaintiff’s chances of winning or losing the lawsuit, i.e., when the threshold of probability is high (a situation in which one party’s version is significantly and compellingly superior to that of the other party). By contrast, when the plaintiff’s
chances of winning are unclear or balanced, the compromise method
should be chosen. Coons deals with a compromise that applies a 50-50
division in cases of factual doubt, when it is not possible to rule in favor of one side as opposed to the other.62 Scholars who favor the
compromise method have recommended it in cases of evidentiary balance (Abramowicz), or advocated a regime of proportional liability in
tort claims based on causal probability,63 as well as liability based on
probability in cases of unclear causation.
B.

Court Arbitration Compromise Verdict as an Opportunity for Performing
Precise Justice

See Coons, Compromise, supra note 20.
John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort Damages based on
Probability, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 231 (1989).
63
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We argue that the opposition to court compromise verdicts is
much more convincing in relation to court imposed compromise verdicts
which are not authorized in advance by the parties. Indeed, in such
cases, the legitimate expectation of the parties is for a decision based on
a determination of legal rights, which reflects a dichotomic all-ornothing approach. Trying to overcome the shortcomings in such
dichotomic decisions based on strict legal rules cannot be done by
courts deviating from these rules, through imposition of compromise
verdicts on the parties. In these cases the parties also feel that there is a
lack of procedural justice, because they are not really aware of what are
the considerations for the court imposed compromise verdicts.
On the other hand, if parties acknowledge the shortcomings of
law both from a jurisprudential perspective and due to efficiency considerations, the possibility of the judge-arbitrator rendering compromise consent verdicts may be much more justified. The parties in such
cases are aware of their legal rights and of their chances of winning in
court, and they nevertheless choose to authorize the court to render
compromise verdicts in a court arbitration process. The parties may
choose to enjoy the benefits of compromise verdicts, and can decide
which mode of compromise they authorize the judge to impose.
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Coons, Compromise, supra note 20, at 753-54.
The reason for this, Coons argues: “As long as we confine our attention to instances of balanced probability, any division other than fifty-fifty would discriminate against one party. In other
words, it would offend the equality principle”. Id. at 759.
66 See id. at 800.
67 Id. at 802; see also id. at 802-03 (“I am not suggestion this would be an across the board
proposition, You have to be very careful about the areas you select”).
68 Id. at 800.
65
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The advantages of court arbitration compromise consent verdicts
over court imposed compromise verdicts, insofar as we are dealing with
the goal of precise justice, extend well beyond the justification and authorization perspectives alone. Expanding the range of possible compromise verdicts is a significant improvement to legal decision making.
Imposed compromise verdict are justified, even according to Coons,
only in specific cases,64 and he lists ten examples in which, due to a factual doubt, the dichotomic legal solution cannot be considered justified
and right in the circumstances. Splitting the difference between the
parties in such cases (which Coons defines as “doubt-compromise”)
should be preferred, but this equally-divided fifty-fifty compromise,
Coons insists, should be strict and not amenable to different divisions.65
Some scholars have challenged that view and called for different types
of divisions, such as seventy-thirty or sixty-forty compromises.66 Others claim that Coons’ proposal does not really overcome the “winner
takes all” perception of law: “You can say that in this particular case we
will compromise for various reasons, but this is a very rare and special
instance where we will allow such a result.”67 Our claim is that adding
the consent element to compromise verdicts will allow the parties to authorize the judge to provide a compromise decision in a court arbitration process which will accurately reflect the parties’ rights or their evidence. It will afford the court broader discretion to approve various
divisions of the pie (not only fifty-fifty) and to do so in a broad range
of cases. Factual controversies require a much more complex perspective based on partiality and probability. According to Fuller:
Except that I think, characteristically, truth questions are closer to
the negligence question than we imply. That is to say something happened; neither one of may be lying. Each is putting his best foot forward; each has improved on the story in remembering it. So you are
asking yourself, well, let’s see, which of these stories is the closest—and
perhaps neither is very close—but you are ready to accept. You are
dealing with probabilities.68
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When parties agree to accept compromise-based decisions in a
court arbitration process they may be considering the possibility of endorsing a decision which takes into account critical claims about legal
decision making.
During the previous century, a famous attack on legal objectivity
and on legal formalism in general was launched by the Legal Realism
movement during the 1920s, followed by the Critical Legal Studies
movement during the 1970s.69 The Realists developed a theory of rule
skepticism and claimed that legal decisions cannot be explained as being “based on mechanistic applications of rules.” Instead, they argued,
it is more realistic to claim that rules are indeterminate and that legal
doctrine is filled with gaps, ambiguities and multiple interpretational
possibilities, which make it impossible to objectively decide cases without exercising a broad discretion. Some of the Realists and their predecessors, like Llewellyn and Kennedy, claimed that behind each rule
there are conflicting principles which call for opposite interpretations,
and that judges can never decide by a pure reference to rules, since balancing between these principles is part of the process of legal decision
making. This balancing cannot be structured rationally, according to
Realists or critical scholars. It is affected by personal or ideological motivations. Another major claim which Realists and other critical writers
developed was that legal facts cannot be determined objectively, and
that judges suffer from biases and multiple perspectives which make
their factual determinations biased and subjective.70 These critiques of
and challenges to basic legal tenets produced turmoil in legal academe
and have been followed by various efforts at reconstruction. One possibility of overcoming the indeterminacy of rules and facts is to propose
a court arbitration judgment based on compromise and not on pure legal reasoning. The possibility of working with critical claims as constructive paradoxes has never been discussed by the Realists, and in arbitration studies, but there may be agreement among the parties that
rule and fact skepticism will guide judges’ decisions when they try to
give a nuanced decision which does not claim for full objectivity. Such
a decision can be called “precise justice” since it overcomes the “winner
takes all” assumption of mainstream jurisprudence. It is more sensitive
to gaps and doubts while remaining pragmatic and constructive when

ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1973).
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working with them.
IV. COMPROMISE AS EQUITY
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Although ruling by compromise based on equity is mentioned in
some places when the development of the common law is reviewed,
the basic rule which remained throughout common law history is that
the winner takes all,71 and equity has not developed as an independent
cause.72 Even in more recent times, again with a few notable exceptions, the traditional rule of “winner takes all” continues to hold sway.73
Why the option of compromise on the basis of equity is not used
widely in common law? This may be related to the struggle between
law and equity. The nature of law is to determine rules, and to provide
solutions which are intended to be applied in future to an unlimited
number of cases. This feature of law creates a unique problem of correlation between case and rule. There are cases, and maybe most of legal cases are such, in which the particular circumstances of the case do
not slot into the strict rules. Aristotle dealt with these situations and
suggested overcoming them through the use of equity, or epiekeia,
which means to amend the law in such a way as to prevent its generality
from interfering with the need to do justice in the concrete case. The
dialectic between legal formality and other considerations is regulated
differently within each legal system. Our efforts are aimed at articulating a certain balance which is appropriate for consent compromise verdicts, and which may expand the traditional perception of the role of
law. But first, let us discuss further the relationship between common
law and equity.
Traditionally, as shown by Atiya, in the English legal tradition
there exist two widely differing approaches to dispute resolution and
the law.74 One approach requires cases to be decided according to generalized and inflexible rules. The second approach emphasizes the importance of individualized justice, of adjudication of the specific facts
of the case in question. Throughout much of English legal history these two approaches have been embodied in the systems of the common
law and Equity respectively. With the crystallization of Equity laws, and
71
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Jaconelli, Solomonic Justice, supra note 20, at 487.
Coons, Compromise, supra note 20, at 767.
73 Jaconelli, Solomonic Justice, supra note 20, at 488.
74 P. S. ATIYA, FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM: CHANGES
JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE LAW (1978).
72
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75 For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see C. K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 399441 (1964).
76 Austin Sarat, The ‘New Formalism’ in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21 Law & Soc’y Rev.
695 (1988).
77 Del. Ch. R. 98(f)(1).
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especially after their inclusion within the common law system during
the 19th century,75 they became more general and predictable. This
process of formalization helped to prevent arbitrariness and at the same
time made these laws less case-sensitive. Some have described the development of the ADR movement as representing the formalization of
a new Equity approach, this time based on the procedural processing of
disputes.76
Our main argument is that the tension between equity and formal
rules exists mainly when a decision by way of equity is imposed upon
the parties without their prior consent, while they expect a purely legal
solution. In such cases, equity may indeed interfere with stability and
equality before the law. It may be considered arbitrary and as causing
instability in the system. There is no room for such a concern, according to our view, when the parties have agreed in advance to an equitybased decision in a court arbitration process. In such cases parties ask
for rules which fit the unique nature of their conflict. The relation between equity-based decision and parties consent is found in Delaware’s
state-sponsored arbitration program mentioned above, in which, as we
had seen in Chapter I, the Chancery Court judge presiding over the
proceedings “[m]ay grant any remedy or relief that [s/he] deems just
and equitable and within the scope of any applicable agreement of the
parties.”77 Still, equity as an open-ended aspiration of law remains a
separate category within our framework.
The limits of formal law have been extensively described and debated in jurisprudential thinking and legal theory in general. We have
tried to present some of the challenges to the formality of law within
the various modes of compromise consent verdicts we proposed for
court arbitration. We believe that these new modes offer new regulated
forms of equity and they all enable various new balances between rules
and discretion. Nevertheless, even after parties consider each of the
three modes on its own merits, we believe that the possibility going
back to Equity as a law making method which incorporates general
considerations of justice may still exist within the system we propose.
A court arbitration by compromise based on ethics will be a return to
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the old role of law making as doing justice, reviving it through the parties’ endorsement.
V. COMPROMISE AS SOCIAL JUSTICE
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The incorporation of distributive justice considerations into legal
decision making is usually considered problematic, since the common
assumption is that the legislator determines the consensual distributive
principles in the law and the judges apply them in an equal way. Cases
of court imposed compromise verdicts have also been criticized when
they invoked such considerations.78 We argue, however, that this criticism is less applicable to court arbitration compromise consent verdicts.
The role of law in promoting social justice has been a major concern of many jurisprudential schools, both from a critical and a normative perspective. A major sociological claim in this context is that within the reality of legal disputes handled in the court, the “haves” have
various advantages over the “have nots”, and that repeat players and
big organizations are more likely to utilize the system to acquire gain
and to win long-term benefits, often at the expense of the disadvantaged.79 From a normative perspective, some have argued that the role
of law is to institute structural reforms, to transform society, and to use
legal decision making to promote a form of justice which is transformative and has an educative value.80 Inequalities in society have been a
major concern for many legal scholars, and traditionally courts and
judges have been considered responsible for balancing them. Although
adjudication is not supposed to favor the poor over the rich on the individual level, and judges are supposed to apply a balanced principled
measure in the concrete case, as a policy matter new rules and precedents are intended, according to some legal thinkers, to promote greater
equality in society and to prevent the oppression of the weaker communities.
A judicial policy of promoting social justice has also been broadly
criticized by some legal scholars and philosophers as anti-democratic,
against integrity and biased. If a certain distribution of goods or as78
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Jaconelli, Solomonic Justice, supra note 20, at 498-504.
Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L.
& Soc’y 95 (1974).
80 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1979).
79
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signments of rights in society was approved by the legislator or has an
historical foundation, how can a judge use her biased interpretive skills
to challenge this distribution and to demarcate the social boundaries in
society? These critics have often described the social justice interpretation as activism, and have called for greater restraint and neutral policy
in applying legal rules.
Our discussion shifts this debate about the role of law in promoting social justice to the more pluralistic terrain of many types of conflicts and many possible legitimate standards for legal decision making.
The recourse to court arbitration compromise consent verdicts may
open a legitimate and unique track for introducing social justice considerations into judicial dispute resolution legal decision making. We are
not suggesting here a policy of promoting social justice while creating
new rules, as some legal scholars have suggested, and therefore we are
not interfering with the majoritarian principle nor with the official distribution principles as provided by the state. Instead we propose a bottom-up market of individual compromises, in which social justice considerations are consensually incorporated into the court arbitration legal
decision making process. Such developments may fit certain types of
disputes, and may promote a more pluralistic consent-based perception
of justice within the legal system.
Cases which include big organizations facing small citizens may
call for an offer to the parties to authorize the judge-arbitrator to incorporate social justice principles in a compromise consent verdict. Such
considerations may anyway infiltrate judges’ decisions, when they deal
with a severe perceived imbalance in a case before them, but usually
their compassionate treatment may be interpreted as biased and as going against the rule of law principle. Organizations’ representative experience in such cases as receiving unfair treatment and as being coerced to give what they do not owe according to the law. In contrast to
the usual mode of adjudication, when social compassion is legitimate
and authorized by the parties as part of the decision making, such
judgment may be good for all parties involved. The weak party will receive acknowledgement and material recognition as a lone gun-man
taking on the big organization. The repeat player organization will gain
a reputation and acknowledgement as having a social justice agenda and
as activist in terms of protecting customers and weak populations. Society will gain greater equality and the closing of systemic gaps from
which it suffers. The legal system may benefit from a pro-social image
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81 See Adam Hofri-Winogradow, A Plurality of Discontent: Legal Pluralism, Religious Adjudication
and the State, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 101-33 (2010).
82 YOEZER ARIEL, LAWS OF ARBITRATION 224 (2005) (Heb.).
83 Id. at 225-26.
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which signifies generosity and social responsibility as publicly encouraged by the court. Such developments may flourish when offered by
law, and may become mainstream modes of decision making in some
areas of law.
Three contemporary examples of compromise verdicts given by
Israeli rabbinical court arbitrators may serve to illustrate the potential in
compromise consent verdicts based on social justice. In these cases the
consent of the parties for such a decision was given by litigants by
choosing the religious court—authorizing it to render a compromise
verdict as an arbitrator—and by preferring it over the general secular
system. We argue that the legal considerations weighed by the religious
court reflect legal pluralism,81 which can become a model of mainstream legal decision making.
The first is the case of a teacher who was fired unfairly at a time
when it was hard for him to find a job.82 Although the school had the
right to fire him according to the contract, and although the teacher
was not poor according to formal criteria, the court ruled “beyond what
the law requires” (lifnim mishurat hadin) that the school should compensate the teacher. The court said that the school has wealthy donors and
its pockets are deeper, so therefore it should compensate the individual
in the name of social justice.
A second example is the case of another teacher who was fired after two years of employment in a school in Safed (northern Israel).
Following his dismissal he had to relocate his family to the south of Israel to his new workplace. After a year the school asked the teacher to
come back and rehired him to teach, but one year later he was fired
again. The teacher sued for compensation for his three years of work
and also for the costs of relocation. The court granted both demands;
among the reasons for its ruling, the court wrote that the plaintiff had
not found a job yet, and since he is considered a pauper the decision
should go “beyond what the law requires” (lifnim mishurat hadin) based
on social justice considerations.83
A third example actually comprises a group of cases in which religious courts enabled debtors to spread out their repayments, even
though from a strict legal perspective they were obligated to repay their
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debt immediately. Such cases were interpreted as following the principle of going beyond what the law requires; taking into account the economic situation of the debtor was within the court’s discretion, since
the parties had agreed in advance to be judged by law or by compromise.84
These examples, which stem from a communal and religious system of law, may inspire mainstream adjudication in secular courts and
expand the possibilities which are available to judges when confronting
legal conflicts. When parties agree to promote certain values and policies, judges should be authorized to respect such choices and to incorporate into the law considerations which go beyond the rules, while not
violating general principles of the rule of law. In time, such developments may acquire their own general characteristics and may function
as open code systems to inform new disputants in new circumstances.
CONCLUSION

Id. at 224-25.
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Our paper has argued for a new role for court arbitration judges
deciding cases by compromise, based on the parties’ consent. We suggested that this mode of judicial dispute resolution can overcome some
basic limitations of legal rules and legal decision making. It can promote more precise justice, overcome the indeterminacy of rules and
facts, promote social justice, enhance equity and combine new considerations into judges’ discretion. With more regulated forms of court
arbitration by compromise and the explicit consent of the parties, the
legal system may become much more pluralistic and nuanced when responding to the complexity of legal cases.
Considering the fact that most cases settle and do not reach a final
formal decision based on law, and that only a small part of them is resolved through ADR, judges have a significant role in the settling of legal disputes. Although their role has changed dramatically in the past
few decades, its new nature has not brought about a corresponding
shift in legal thought, and has remained largely unexplored. Our paper
contributes to a new conceptualization, hopefully followed by new regulation, of the judges’ role in cases of consent of the parties to court
arbitration compromise verdicts. Such consent makes possible an interesting mixture of authority and consent, legal rules and social complexity, autonomy and community, old and new.

